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I. INTRODUCTION 
How should the legal system address conflicts that occur in very small 
environments? The conflicts come in many kinds, including a nuisance 
dispute between neighbors, an impending collision between two moving 
vehicles, a joint decision between spouses about whether or on what terms to 
continue their marriage, or a disagreement between managers and 
shareholders within a firm. 
The literature often refers to these small environments as “markets.” 
Considering them in that way, however, averts our attention from larger 
environments that should be included in the inquiry but that often do not 
function well as private markets. The term “institutions” is better, because it 
encompasses environments in which people have both market (exchange-
based) and non-market interactions. Further, institutions are human 
creations, while environments need not be. 
One way to think of the problem is as “market fracture,” or the cost of 
breaking the arenas in which people interact into excessively small pieces. 
Focusing on the larger rather than the smaller arena can enable an increase 
in social wealth or welfare but may also require greater state oversight. In the 
process it may also require us to abandon the language of markets or 
constrain its use, particularly in situations where instability (cycling) or 
behavioral issues are prominent. In these settings the “market” is often little 
more than an unhelpful metaphor. 
People’s options often narrow as their commitment to a course of action 
becomes deeper or more specific. One good example is marriage. While the 
market for getting married is large and competitive, depending on the size of 
the community, the market for divorce is a bilateral monopoly: you can get a 
divorce only from the one you are with. This partly explains why most divorces 
are more costly than most weddings. But if we assumed that the divorce rate 
is excessive and something should be done about it, the fix might require state 
intervention in the marriage market. That is, it may be preferable to fix this 
problem earlier rather than later. 
Alternatively, employers and prospective employees may bargain over 
jobs in a competitive market. Post-hiring promotion or termination issues are 
negotiated in a much smaller institution, however, which may also be a 
bilateral monopoly in some cases. 
Similarly, when a farmer in early spring makes a decision about what to 
plant, the “market” she faces includes the full range of products she is capable 
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of growing on her land and with her existing equipment. Once she has 
planted beans, however, the market she faces is typically reduced to that 
product, although it may be salable over a large geographic range. After the 
beans have been delivered to a particular store, the market for them may 
consist only of the subset of people who shop there. Each further stage in the 
process fractures the market further and leaves people with a smaller range 
of choices, provided that the costs of reversing the decision are greater than 
the payoffs from switching. 
To the extent reversal is costly, making a decision earlier saves more 
resources than making it later. Indeed, the prospective farmer faces her 
largest range of choices before she has settled on farming as a career at all. At 
that time even her purchase of land and equipment is one of many options. 
In addition, the decisions to enter farming, to grow beans in a particular year, 
or to sell them to a particular store may have been mistakes. If so, they are 
corrected more cheaply earlier rather than later. 
In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase identified the costs of 
bargaining as the main impediment to the free and efficient flow of 
resources.1 As a result, Coase argued throughout his career that transaction 
costs make a legal system important to social ordering.2 Coase wrote about 
several common law disputes among neighbors whose economic activities 
conflicted with one another. One of them was Sturges v. Bridgman, a 19th- 
century British nuisance case between the two occupants of a duplex building 
sharing a party wall.3 Octavius Sturges was a London pediatrician who 
specialized in childrens’ respiratory diseases, such as pneumonia. Frederick 
Horatio Bridgman was a confectioner to Queen Victoria, whose process for 
making sweets required him to use a mechanical mortar and pestle to 
pulverize substances such as chocolate.4 The nuisance dispute arose when 
Sturges complained that Bridgman’s machine, with its repetitive pounding, 
made it impossible for Sturges to use his stethoscope to diagnose patients. 
Coase argued that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private 
bargaining would provide a solution to the problem of conflicting uses, which 
he characterized as “efficient.” By that he meant that the right to continue 
would be given to the person who valued it most.5 For example, if the 
pediatrician valued the right to relative silence at £100, while the confectioner 
valued the right to conduct his business at £60, the efficient solution would 
preserve the pediatrician’s £100 value over the confectioner’s £60 value. If no 
 
 1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
 2. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Professor, Univ. Chi. Law Sch., The Institutional Structure of 
Production, Prize Lecture for the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (Dec. 9, 
1991), in 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992). 
 3. See generally Sturges v. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch.D. 852 (1879). 
 4. For more on the players and the facts in Sturges v. Bridgman, see generally A.W. Brian 
Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 54–58 (1996). 
 5. Coase, supra note 1, at 16. 
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one else was affected, then this outcome made society as a whole wealthier as 
well. 
Alternative solutions might preserve the ability of both parties to operate, 
however, generating a social value of £160. Coase did not consider these, 
because the tiny market he considered was too small to include them. He was 
concerned with transaction costs, and on his assumptions the only parties who 
could transact were Sturges and Bridgman. This tiny microcosm was the 
appropriate institution for analysis because Sturges and Bridgman were 
locked together by virtue of their own previous investments. Stepping back to 
an earlier point in time and considering a broader range of alternatives was 
not economically feasible if the payoff to extraction was less than the payoff 
to staying inside their tiny market and reaching an agreement. 
The greater benefit from stepping back does not result from eliminating 
or internalizing an externality. The problem is not that looking at the smaller 
environment ignores an uncompensated injury that one person imposes on 
another, but rather that the larger environment prevents certain injuries from 
arising in the first place. Neither does it have anything to do with transaction 
costs: the parties might be able to bargain costlessly to a maximizing solution 
within their current environment but would still be unable to achieve the 
gains that the larger environment permits. 
These costs of reversal are sometimes transaction costs, but often they are 
simply a cost of moving resources. For example, the farmer who realizes too 
late that planting beans was a mistake may have to plow up the bean field, 
prepare the soil a second time, and plant spinach or some other crop. 
Assuming she does the work herself, however, most of these costs would not 
be costs of transacting, although some transactions, such as the purchase of 
substitute seed, could be involved as well. 
Transaction costs in one’s current setting are only a portion of the costs 
of locating the best place for resources. Considering all relevant costs usually 
requires us to focus on larger institutions and longer time periods than the 
fractured markets that inhabit Coase. 
A good counterexample to Sturges and Bridgman is the law and 
economics of automobile accidents, where assumptions about the high costs 
of bargaining have turned attention to the overall markets where automobiles 
operate rather than individual pairwise arrangements. When we refocus our 
attention in this way, the results that Coase described as efficient are 
frequently suboptimal. In fact, as developed below, the practical inability of 
rapidly moving motor vehicles to negotiate with each other over who should 
yield has forced decision makers to step back and consider the larger setting 
in which these decisions are made. As a result, outcomes in cases involving 
traffic rules are inherently superior to outcomes in cases involving nuisance 
disputes between neighbors.6 
 
 6. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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One important source of social savings is determining where resources 
should be assigned initially, thus limiting the occasions and costs for further 
movement. Discovering that planting beans or marrying a particular partner 
is a mistake is best made before planting or marrying. Further, these costs of 
waiting are higher as initial resource investment is less coordinated, more 
costly, or more specialized as to activity and location. Determining the initial 
location of resources often requires us to consider the interests of larger 
numbers of players, however, encompassing a larger institution in which 
resources move around. Markets like those envisioned in The Problem of Social 
Cost, which move resources only by unanimous consent, work more poorly as 
the number of participants increases.7 Coase himself realized that in such 
cases government intervention may be preferable even for relatively simple 
conflicts traditionally analyzed under the common law of nuisance or trespass. 
Finally, as the next section develops, when we consider the full range of 
relevant decisions only a small portion of the costs to be considered are 
“transaction” costs. 
II. THE COSTS OF RESOURCE MOVEMENT 
Moving things from one place to another is costly. I may have a second 
television that would be of better use in my son’s apartment, because he has 
none. If he values it more than I do, moving it might be a good idea. But I live 
in Iowa City, while he is in New York. Moving the television to New York might 
cost $150, and he could buy a good used one or perhaps a small new one in 
New York for less. In that case moving the television actually decreases its net 
value even though he values my television more than I do. 
Most people spend substantial time considering the costs of moving 
resources around. We make decisions about where to live in relation to work, 
where to go on vacation, where to shop and how to organize a multi-store trip, 
or whether to shop in person or online. The best course of action is usually to 
get our plan right the first time, for fixing it later costs more. The relevant 
costs can range from relatively small, as in a poorly organized grocery list, to 
quite large, in the case of a bad choice of a location for one’s home or 
business, or marriage partner. 
Traditionally, economics paid surprisingly little attention to the cost of 
moving resources. Nobel laureate Douglass North once complained that 
neoclassical economics avoided “all of the interesting questions,” because 
“[t]he world with which [economics] is concerned is a frictionless one in 
which institutions do not exist and all change occurs through perfectly 
operating markets. In short, the costs of acquiring information, uncertainty, 
and transactions costs do not exist.”8 
 
 7. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 8. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 5 (1981); see also 
MARTIN HOLLIS & EDWARD J. NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF 
HOVENKAMP_PP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2014  3:30 PM 
622 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:617 
In economic models, resources often move without friction from lower-
value to higher-value positions until the economy is in equilibrium, or a steady 
state in which no further gains from resource movement are possible. One 
important economist who took exception to this was Cambridge economist 
Arthur Cecil Pigou. Writing in the 1920s and 1930s, he was deeply concerned 
about the costs of moving resources.9 Prior to the time of Coase, however, 
Pigou was somewhat at odds with his discipline. 
Coase’s work turned people’s attention to “transaction costs,” particularly 
to his theory that the cost of reaching a suitable private agreement is what 
accounts for the legal system. Transaction costs are only a subset of the costs 
of moving resources, however, and often a fairly small subset. If I loaded my 
TV into my van and drove it to New York, getting it there would be costly. 
These would not be “transaction costs,” however, except for purchases of 
gasoline, tolls, and perhaps a motel room along the way. Indeed, Coase 
argued in his well-known 1937 article, The Nature of the Firm, that minimization 
of all kinds of costs, including transaction costs, determines which things a 
firm will do for itself internally and which it will purchase on a market.10 For 
example, cleaning the office windows could be done by the firm’s own 
employees or else by contracting with a window washing service. When it 
makes this decision, the firm really does not care that one of these is a 
“transaction” cost while the other is not. The only thing that matters is which 
costs less. 
The term “transaction costs” is overused in law and economics, 
particularly when it is applied to costs unrelated to transactions. For me to 
wash my own windows is costly, but using my own labor is not a transaction 
cost. Often nontransaction costs are wrapped up into a bargain in such a way 
that they disguise the deal’s nontransactional components. For example, if I 
am an apple grower selling to a retailer 50 miles away, my crop of apples will 
need to be shipped. Shipping could clearly be part of our negotiated 
transaction. Shipping in this case is not a “transaction” cost, but rather a cost 
of resource movement. If I grew my apples in one place and owned a fruit 
stand 50 miles away, I would still have to ship them, even though no 
transactions are necessarily involved. I might load them onto my own truck 
and drive them to the fruit stand myself. Whether or not I “transact,” the 
apples must still be moved. Indeed, if I purchased transportation services in a 
competitive market, only a small part of the price would reflect transaction 
costs; the rest would cover the physical cost of getting my apples from one 
place to another. 
 
NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 233–37 (1975) (arguing that the neo-classical “assumption of easy, 
costless transfer of resources is nonsensical”); Charles K. Rowley, Rent-Seeking Versus Directly 
Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 15, 18 (Charles 
K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988) (describing neo-classical economists’ views on transfers). 
 9. See infra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
 10. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). 
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Coase observed that if the costs of transacting were greater than the 
increase in value that resulted from a transfer, then the transaction would not 
occur. He began with the traditional economic observation that resources 
under free choice move from lower to higher value uses. But then he added 
the important qualifier that “this assumed costless market transactions.”11 
Further, 
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into 
account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be 
undertaken when the increase in the value of production 
consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which 
would be involved in bringing it about. When it is less, the granting 
of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the 
liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued 
(or may prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if 
market transactions were costless. In these conditions the initial 
delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with 
which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights 
may bring about a greater value of production than any other. But 
unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal 
system, the costs of reaching the same result by altering and 
combining rights through the market may be so great that this 
optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of production 
which it would bring, may never be achieved.12 
Pigou had made exactly the same point three decades earlier, but he spoke 
more globally of the “costs of movement,” which encompassed all the costs of 
getting a resource from one use to another: 
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a unit of 
resources can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an annual 
charge of n shillings for every year during which a unit that is moved 
continues in productive work in its new home. In these 
circumstances the national dividend will be increased by the 
movement of resources from A to B, so long as the annual value of 
the marginal social net product at B exceeds that at A by more than 
n shillings . . . .13 
 
 11. Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
 12. Id. at 15–16. See generally Coase, supra note 2. 
 13. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 138 (4th ed. 1962). Pigou used the term 
“national dividend” to mean aggregate social income—specifically, “the national dividend is that 
part of the objective income of the community, including, of course, income derived from 
abroad, which can be measured in money.” Id. at 31; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and 
the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71–72 (2012) (explaining how antitrust policy can 
relate to the costs of resource movement other than transaction costs); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 504 (2011) (noting 
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Many of the things that Pigou included as costs of movement were ones 
that Coase later characterized as transaction costs.14 In addition, however, 
were many other costs, including lack of information and education,15 
transportation,16 and commuting distances and time for workers.17 He also 
included some costs that today might be characterized as behavioral, such as 
imperfect knowledge, noting that imperfect knowledge might cause people 
either to exaggerate or understate the costs of moving a resource.18 Pigou 
observed that reducing these costs of movement enabled a division of labor, 
resulting in cheaper or better quality goods.19 For example, Pigou noted that 
machine production reduced the demand for skilled labor, and that unskilled 
laborers could generally be redeployed at lower cost than skilled workers, thus 
enabling workers to be shifted more cheaply as product needs changed.20 
A. RELATIVE DEADWEIGHT LOSS 
The costs of movement in general, or transaction costs in particular, are 
sometimes described as an economic “dead-weight loss.”21 That conclusion is 
not useful for policy purposes, however, unless we ask “compared to what?” 
For example, we speak of the deadweight loss of monopoly only by comparing 
it to a competitive economy, or else to some alternative market thought to be 
 
that “[p]rior to Pigou . . . the marginalists largely ignored the cost of moving resources”); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 637–38 (2009) 
(discussing Pigou’s contributions to the Coasian theory of transaction costs); cf. Harold Demsetz, 
The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem?: A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2011) (acknowledging the differences between transaction and other 
resource movement costs); Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1471, 1483–93 (2013) (using the term “resource allocation” to describe movement costs). 
 14. E.g., PIGOU, supra note 13, at 158: 
[P]ayments that have to be made to various agents in the capital market, promoters, 
financing syndicates, investment trusts, solicitors, bankers, and others, who, in 
varying degrees according to the nature of the investment concerned, help in the 
work of transporting capital from its places of origin to its places of employment. 
 15. See id. at 149–57 (discussing the impact of imperfect knowledge on the movement of 
resources).  
 16. See id. at 290–317 (discussing the effects of railroad rate structure on the movement of 
resources).  
 17. See id. at 482–84. 
 18. Id. at 144–45. 
 19. Id. at 488–518. 
 20. Id. at 488–511. 
 21. Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 577, 579 
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frieder Frasch, Transaction Costs of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme in German Companies, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 48, 48 (2007) 
(“[A]ll transaction costs are ‘deadweight losses.’”); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer 
Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1683 (2006) 
(explaining the objectionable nature of transaction costs as “deadweight losses that reduce 
efficiency”). 
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more competitive.22 By contrast, if we are speaking of social gains from 
innovation, then there is ample support for the position that the monopolist 
produces greater value than a group of competitive firms, so the net 
deadweight loss from monopoly may actually be negative.23 
If the baseline is a frictionless economy in which everything moves 
costlessly from one use to another, then any cost of movement is a deadweight 
loss. But no one inhabits such an economy. A more useful definition is that a 
cost of moving a resource is a deadweight loss to the extent that it is more 
costly than equally good and available alternatives. Ceteris paribus, going from 
more to less costly means of moving resources, will generally produce net 
gains, provided that nonparties are not adversely affected. An important 
corollary is that a search for greater efficiency, assuming that is our goal, 
requires us continuously to seek out lower costs of moving resources around 
and—equally important—mechanisms for getting them into the right place 
to begin with. 
B. THE CHOICE OF AN INITIAL POSITION AND THE VALUE OF PLANNING 
Another important corollary, stressed by Pigou and later by Calabresi, but 
not by Coase, is that placing resources initially in their highest value use is 
efficient to the extent it makes further movement unnecessary.24 It does not 
matter whether these costs of movement are transactional or 
nontransactional. For example, Pigou was particularly concerned about the 
extent to which workers were often initially assigned to low-value occupations, 
largely because of family tradition or lack of education.25 
In Coase’s conception, efficiency is undermined by externalities whose 
costs cannot be internalized because transaction costs are too high. For 
example, the noise of Bridgman’s mortar and pestle imposes a negative 
externality on Sturges. This is a resource conflict the parties can address by 
bargaining. If the legal system assigns the right to the wrong person, however, 
 
 22. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE 19–20 (4th ed. 2011). 
 23. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 9–10 (2012). 
 24. See PIGOU, supra note 13, at 138. 
 25. Pigou explained this problem as a result of ignorance: 
The most fundamental way in which the first of these causes, ignorance, operates is 
by impairing the initial distribution of new generations of workpeople as they flow 
into industry. Those persons who direct the choice of avocations made by young 
men and women entering industry are ignorant both of the level at which the 
demand price for any given quantity of labour of any given grade will stand in 
different occupations at a later period of those young persons’ lives, and also of what 
the quantity of labour offering itself in those different occupations at that period 
will be. 
Id. at 492. On the problem today, see generally Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, Improving Efficiency in 
School Choice, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARKET DESIGN 170 (Nir Vulkan et al. eds., 2013). 
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high transaction costs may prevent it from being transferred to the correct 
one. 
But suppose that upon first entering the confection trade, Bridgman 
could have chosen between two equally suitable buildings that cost the same. 
He chose the one that later created the conflict with Sturges. The other 
building would be occupied by a different noise-making business that would 
not have been bothered by Bridgman’s mortar and pestle—say, an implement 
sharpener. Once the decision creating the conflict is made, relocating to the 
alternative place would cost £25, but initially it would have cost Bridgman the 
same amount to move into either location, so the net cost would be zero. This 
lost £25 shows up now to the extent that reciprocal bargaining obliges either 
Bridgman or Sturges to pay it, depending on how the law assigns liability. For 
example, if the law finds against Sturges, holding that there is no nuisance, 
then Sturges must pay Bridgman at least £25 to get him to move. By contrast, 
if Bridgman had moved into the correct place to begin with, neither would 
have to pay and society would be £25 richer. 
Of course, if resources moved without friction or other cost, then 
Bridgman’s initial choice would not have made any difference. Planning 
would be unimportant because any mistake could be costlessly reversed. In 
the world we live in, however, getting the first decision right is an essential 
element in efficiency. Or, to state it more generally: long-range planning 
becomes more important as all of the costs of movement, both transactional 
and nontransactional, are higher and more costly to reverse. To that extent, 
planning enables society to avoid the cost of market fracture. 
The law and economics of traffic accidents takes a very different 
approach to this problem. It considers the full market in which automobiles 
operate rather than the relationship, or market, that exists between a pair of 
automobiles approaching one another.26 For example, the American rule 
requiring driving on the right side of the road, or the uniform state-imposed 
rule that automobiles must yield to trains at grade crossings, perform the same 
function: they ensure that operators need not engage in pairwise bargaining 
just before a collision is about to occur. These are basically “zoning” rules for 
the road, which rely on conventions or cost avoidance as a surrogate for 
bargaining. Their goal is to get people into the right place from the 
beginning, so that subsequent bargaining will not be necessary. The premise 
for state-enforced traffic rules is that greater government intervention is 
needed because individual bargaining is less likely to be effective. When all 
the relevant costs of land-use externalities are considered, however, including 
the cost of not being in the right place from the beginning, the differences 
between traffic rules and zoning rules become relatively insignificant. 
Common law nuisance rules, such as those in Sturges v. Bridgman, take the 
 
 26. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
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parties where they are already located. By contrast, zoning rules prevent them 
from moving into conflict-producing situations in the first place. 
III. COASEAN MARKETS 
Those who read Coase have seen a variety of things, many of which Coase 
himself did not see or would likely have rejected. Nevertheless, the institutions 
that are central to the functioning of the legal system in Coase’s analysis have 
some distinctive features. One is Coase’s very narrow conception of 
“efficiency” or social savings.27 A second is that the markets that occupy his 
analysis are typically very small. How small they are is determined by the costs 
of movement, both transactional and nontransactional, from a given starting 
position.28 A third feature of Coasean markets is that moving resources within 
them requires unanimous agreement of the relevant participants. As Coase 
himself acknowledged more than once, this fact has important implications 
for the efficacy of bargained solutions as the number of individuals bargaining 
increases.29 
A. IDENTIFYING THE EFFICIENT OUTCOME 
Traditional competitive markets typically have large numbers of buyers 
and sellers, but a single buyer and a single seller are sufficient to make a trade. 
For example, if I buy a loaf of bread from my grocer, both the grocer and I 
are better off. The market for bread contains many other buyers and sellers 
who did not participate in this transaction. They are largely indifferent to my 
particular deal, except to the extent that one or more of them had been 
competing for my trade, or that I took the last loaf on the shelf. In some cases 
others will use information about my trade to inform their own choices. They 
will go on to make their trades with others. While a particular transaction 
occurs at the “micro” level, the overall market could be very large, perhaps 
even nationwide or worldwide. 
These traditional markets are not the ones contemplated in The Problem 
of Social Cost. There, the trade and the market are the same size. Think back 
to Sturges v. Bridgman, which Coase used to illustrate how private bargaining 
could resolve the dispute without the intervention of the legal system. Rather 
than thinking of one party as a victim of a wrongdoer’s negative externality, 
Coase argued, we should treat each as having a tradable property interest that 
conflicts with the interest of the other. They are like two people vying to park 
their cars in the same spot. Assuming that they bargain, the winner will be the 
person who places the higher value on the right. Suppose Sturges values the 
right to be free of the noise by £100, while Bridgman values the right to use 
his noisy machine by £60. Suppose also that the law said Sturges would lose 
 
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
 29. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
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his lawsuit because the operation of the mortar and pestle is not a nuisance. 
Sturges would pay Bridgman a sum between £60 and £100, Bridgman would 
shut down the machine, and both parties would be better off. For example, if 
Sturges paid Bridgman £75, Bridgman would be £15 better off and Sturges 
would be £25 better off. Suppose, however, that the law of London provided 
that the machine was a nuisance, entitling Sturges to an injunction shutting it 
down. Bridgman might wish to settle with a money payment, but the most he 
would pay is £60 and the least Sturges would accept is £100. No settlement 
would occur and the injunction would shut the machine down. 
This story illustrates both the “invariance” corollary and the “efficiency” 
corollary of the Coase Theorem.30 The invariance corollary is somewhat 
counterintuitive and its domain has been controversial, particularly where the 
participants are not risk neutral.31 The decision whether Bridgman’s mortar 
and pestle continues to operate is not determined by whether it is an unlawful 
nuisance, but rather by the respective values that the two parties place on the 
right in question. In its strongest form, the theorem states that in the absence 
of transaction costs, common law rules have nothing whatsoever to do with 
how resources are allocated, although they may force some money to change 
hands. In the nuisance jurisdiction the mortar and pestle is shut down and 
neither party pays anything to the other. In the no-nuisance jurisdiction the 
mortar and pestle is also shut down, but this time physician Sturges pays 
Bridgman between £60 and £100 to shut down. 
In order for the invariance thesis to apply the rights in question must be 
“alienable,” which means that they can be traded through private settlement 
of a lawsuit.32 Common law rights are generally alienable in this fashion. 
However, many statutory rights or public regulations are not. For example, 
even if a noisy machine produced larger gains to its owners than harm to 
others, neighbors would not be able to negotiate around a zoning statute that 
forbade it. A neighbor typically has no right to “waive” his neighbor’s 
obligations under the zoning laws. 
The efficiency corollary of the Coase Theorem states that in a well-
functioning market the outcome will be “efficient,” which means that it 
maximizes the wealth of the two parties and thus social wealth, assuming that 
no one else is affected. The Coasean bargain assigns the disputed interest to 
 
 30. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101–06 (2004). 
 31. Under declining marginal utility or an “endowment” effect, the invariance corollary may 
not hold true, at least not for human actors or firms that are not risk neutral. See generally Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990); Daniel 
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
1325 (1990). For additional analysis, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal 
Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (noting that the endowment effect is “the principal 
that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do not”). 
 32. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972). 
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the person who values it most highly. In the given example, the physician’s 
right to be free of the noise is worth £100, while the confectioner’s right to 
create the noise is worth only £60. Forcibly granting the right to the 
confectioner would destroy £100 in resources in favor of a value of only £60. 
Thus the “efficient” outcome is defined as the one that produces the £100 
right. 
Describing this as the “efficient” outcome is myopic, however, in one 
critical sense. We must ask, “Compared to what?” Clearly an even more 
efficient outcome would be one where both Sturges and Bridgman could 
conduct their business without interference from the other. This would 
generate total value of £160. Coase did not consider this a viable alternative 
because he took the location of Sturges and Bridgman in the same building 
as a given. The fractured market in which he analyzed the conflict was one in 
which Sturges and Bridgman faced only each other. 
Society’s ability to attain the £160 by looking at the longer run has 
nothing to do with either externalities or transaction costs in the micromarket 
that Sturges and Bridgman occupy. Efficiency queries typically look at the 
wealth created (or destroyed) in the market at hand. Harms imposed on 
others are externalities to the extent that they are not settled by bargaining 
or imposition of the correct legal rule. But stepping back and looking at a 
larger setting often permits superior solutions if extraction is costly. In a larger 
environment this particular externality may not have come into existence in 
the first place. 
B. MICROMARKETS: FUNCTIONALITY AND FRACTURE 
Coase focused the economic analysis of law on “micromarkets,” or 
situations involving very small groups of traders who are locked together by 
some preexisting commitment, whether it be tenants sharing a duplex, 
neighbors in a subdivision, two automobiles speeding toward one another, an 
unhappy marriage, or disputes between shareholders and managers in a 
single corporation.33 
One problem with these Coasean markets is that they are rarely very 
competitive. Sturges and Bridgman have only each other to bargain with, and 
bilateral monopolies of this sort often lead to difficulty in reaching outcomes. 
They can generate high transaction costs because there is no competition to 
discipline each person’s ask or offer prices. Joint maximization may be 
frustrated by each person’s incentive to hide information from the other.34 
 
 33. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (discussing 
the application of the Coase Theorem in family law, torts, corporations and other business 
associations, and financial markets). 
 34. See generally Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 
831 (1989). On bilateral monopoly and the Coase Theorem, see generally Robert Cooter, The Cost 
of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). Among the earliest observations of indeterminacy in strictly 
bilateral trading is FRANCIS YSIDRO EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
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These problems are exacerbated as Coasean markets have larger numbers of 
actors because unanimity is a precondition to trading. Such markets are not 
“bilateral” monopolies. Nevertheless, they have all the efficiency-challenging 
characteristics of bilateral monopolies, except magnified.35 
London in 1879 undoubtedly had hundreds of physicians, hundreds of 
confectioners, and thousands of duplexes or other buildings suitable for 
business. When we ordinarily talk about markets we would think of this range 
of providers. Physicians compete with each other, as do confectioners and 
landlords, and new ones continuously enter the trade. But the “market” at 
issue in Coase’s article was a peculiar one, limited to a single physician, a 
single confectioner, and a single building. This is so mainly because the size 
of the market under contemplation depends heavily on the time at which we 
view it. 
What makes the relationship between solitary Sturges, solitary Bridgman, 
and their solitary duplex a “market”? The answer is that prior commitments 
plus the costs of movement define this market’s boundaries. Sturges and 
Bridgman are stuck together by virtue of a previous investment each of them 
had made in the same building and that later turns out to be mistaken.36 As a 
result, neither competition with other confectioners or physicians nor the 
possibility of new entry is relevant. For example, suppose as before that 
Sturges valued the right to be free of Bridgman’s noise at £100, while 
Bridgman valued use of the mortar and pestle in his business at £60. But 
suppose that for £35 Bridgman could move to an equally good location with 
no noise or other conflict and no harm to his business. No matter how liability 
was assigned, Bridgman would move. In a nuisance jurisdiction he would 
move rather than shut down. In a no nuisance jurisdiction Sturges would pay 
him to move, which would require less than paying him to shut down. If 
Bridgman had moved to a location with no conflict to begin with, however, 
his moving costs would be zero. 
Coase had actually recognized this in 1937, in The Nature of the Firm.37 A 
profit-maximizing firm would compare the cost of all available alternatives for 
getting something accomplished, choosing the value maximizing solution.38 
The message of Coase’s 1937 article is that when we consider the problem of 
 
APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 29–33 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 
1967) (1881). See generally Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and 
Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 101 (1960). 
 35. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 36. Compare this with “lock in” as a theory justifying very small markets in antitrust cases. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, at 103–04. For example, those who already own a Kodak photocopier 
are locked in to an ongoing supply of service and repair parts, thus making “Kodak parts” or 
“Kodak service” a relevant market to them. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 
504 U.S. 451, 458–59 (1992) (accepting this theory); 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 564b (4th ed. 2013) (critiquing the Eastman Kodak decision). 
 37. See Coase, supra note 10. 
 38. Id. at 394–95. 
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Sturges and Bridgman, focusing exclusively on transaction costs and on the 
micromarket that their dispute created can lead us astray. Rather, we should 
consider all of the costs of moving resources, including transaction costs, as 
well as the full range of places and times where movement can occur. The 
differences can be important. Coase’s approach in The Nature of the Firm 
compared the cost of transacting against the cost of getting something done 
by any other means, not limited to transactions. By transacting, a firm would 
shift activity outside of the firm. By not transacting it would perform that 
activity inside. For those purposes, the cost of redeploying resources initially 
invested badly would also be a cost. The “cheapest cost avoider” gets it right 
the first time. 
By focusing exclusively on transaction costs from a position defined by 
previous investment, Coasean thinking shifted our attention to the fractured 
micromarkets in which disputes arise in the short run. Previous choices bind 
the two actors together, and extraction is costly. But suppose that we had been 
able to steer either Sturges or Bridgman to a different location to begin with, 
a policy that Pigou advocated strenuously.39 In that case the cost of movement 
could have been even lower, certainly less than the cost of moving to one 
address and then relocating to another. The truly efficient solution to Sturges 
v. Bridgman is the one that permits each of them to operate without 
interference by the other. Further, the most efficient version of that choice is 
likely to be one that defines their property interests in such a way that they 
never become neighbors in the first place. 
In an example that Coase used frequently, once a polluting smokestack 
and a residential neighborhood are constructed and in place, bargaining 
assigns the right to the higher value participants.40 But an even higher value 
could be obtained if a zoning law forbade smokestacks and homes from 
locating in close proximity to begin with—or perhaps if the parties had the 
foresight to see into the future and bargain about location before making any 
initial investment. The Coasean reasoning forces us to think of the “market” 
as the relationship between neighbors whose uses are already in place, in the 
process ignoring a larger market that presented a greater array of choices. 
C. THE COUNTEREXAMPLE OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 
The law and economics of automobile accidents went in a different 
direction from nuisance law, largely because actual transacting was such an 
unpromising solution. In the first law review article to cite The Problem of Social 
Cost, Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., from the University of Chicago, noted 
the importance of Coase’s work in assessing resource conflict.41 They 
 
 39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 40. Coase, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–13. 
 41. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto 
Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 699–700 (1964). 
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concluded that it could not be applied to automobile accidents, however.42 In 
traffic collision cases people do not know in advance who their bargaining 
opposites are until it is too late, and there are other significant limitations to 
their ability to bargain over such issues as the right of way.43 
Guido Calabresi responded that the way to think about the problem is to 
imagine who would have won the bargain in a regime in which bargaining had 
been possible. Under bargaining in a well-functioning market, the person 
who ends up taking the precaution is the one in a position to avoid the 
accident at the lowest cost. Thus the “cheapest cost avoider” entered the 
lexicon of law and economics.44 As Calabresi observed, a “pure market” 
approach to the problem of minimizing accident costs would be to “allocate 
the costs to those acts or activities that an arbitrary initial bearer of accident 
costs would (in the absence of transaction and information costs) find it most 
worthwhile to ‘bribe’ in order to obtain that modification of behavior which 
would lessen accident costs most.”45 
While Calabresi was responding to a problem of extremely high 
transaction costs, his solution to the traffic accident problem is not about 
transaction costs at all, but about the generally nontransactional costs of 
movement. For example, consider the common law rule adopted by the 
Supreme Court and apparently every state that, at grade level railroad 
crossings, trains have the right of way over wagons, cars, or other vehicles who 
cross the tracks. Nineteenth century courts at all levels derived the rule from 
the “character and momentum” of the train as opposed to a wagon or 
automobile: 
From the character and momentum of a railroad train, and the 
requirements of public travel by means thereof, it cannot be 
expected that it shall stop and give precedence to an approaching 
 
 42. Id. at 700. 
 43. Id. See generally Steven G. Medema, Rethinking Market Failure: ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ 
Before the ‘Coase Theorem’ (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2188728 (exploring Coase’s early influence). 
 44. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135 & n.1. Calabresi observed that these costs were not 
transaction costs at all, but rather alternatives, or substitutes, for transacting. See Guido Calabresi 
& Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–61 n.20 
(1972); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 
J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968). Coase had also observed in relation to pairwise bargaining that when 
transaction costs are high, the legal system should assign the right initially to the person who 
placed the highest value on it. Coase, supra note 1, at 15–17. 
 45. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135. The first edition of Richard A. Posner’s Economic 
Analysis of Law expressed the same idea in terms of mimicking the market. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 18 (1st ed. 1972) (“Transaction costs are minimized when the law 
(1) assigns the right to the party who would buy it from the other party if it were assigned to the 
other party instead and if transaction costs were zero, or (2) alternatively, places liability on the 
party who, if he had the right and transaction costs were zero, would sell it to the other party.” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
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wagon to make the crossing first: it is the duty of the wagon to wait 
for the train.46 
The rationale is fairly simple: it costs a great deal more to stop and restart 
a train than to stop and restart a car. If the train would incur costs of $2.00 
while the car would incur costs of 20 cents, then the parties would bargain for 
an outcome in which the train would have the right of way. If payment were 
necessary, the amount would be somewhere between 20 cents and $2.00. 
While this problem can be recast as one in transaction costs, it is not a 
transaction cost problem at all, but one related to the mechanical and energy 
costs of stopping and restarting heavier versus lighter or faster versus slower 
vehicles. Indeed, the fact that the problem relates to engineering or 
mechanical costs rather than bargaining costs is what permits us to generalize 
across the full range of similar conflicts. We can address the problem on a 
“class” basis, or legislatively, rather than by assessing individual pairwise 
conflicts. Thinking of the problem as one in bargaining may be an interesting 
metaphor, but it does not add anything to the solution. It indicates only the 
truism that the costs of movement that require a bargain are always at least as 
great as the costs of movement alone. If we required a transaction, then the 
higher total costs of reaching the right result would make the good outcome 
less certain, but that is only because we have added the complexity of an 
unnecessary bargain. 
One important difference between transaction costs and 
nontransactional costs of movement is that the latter typically relate to 
engineering, transportation, or sometimes social convention (such as driving 
on the right side of the road). These are all processes that are capable of 
evaluation by outside observers. By contrast, transaction costs depend on 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept—numbers that are subjective and 
much more difficult to observe, particularly if we are talking about natural 
persons rather than business firms. When we think about good traffic rules, 
casting the problem in terms of one person’s willingness-to-pay and another’s 
willingness-to-accept overly subjectifies what is fundamentally a problem in 
risk management. For example, a civil engineer’s observations about 
appropriate rules for trains and cars at grade crossings gives us much better 
 
 46. Cont’l Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U.S. 161, 164 (1877); accord Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 
of Can. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 431 (1892) (noting that a person “approaching a railroad crossing, 
ought to make a vigilant use of his senses of sight and hearing, in order to avoid a collision”); 
Brown v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 7 So. 682, 683 (La. 1890) (commending the district court judge for 
applying the Continental Improvement Co. rule); Del Buono v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 124 So. 694, 696 
(La. Ct. App. 1929) (discussing the “superior right of the train”). The Supreme Court’s 
“character and momentum” statement was used in state court jury instructions on duty to yield. 
See, e.g., Kan. City, M. & O. Ry. Co. v. McDaniel, 165 P. 1144, 1144 (Okla. 1917) (considering a 
collision between a train and a wagon); Brogdon v. Nw. R.R. Co. of S.C., 139 S.E. 459, 462 (S.C. 
1927) (considering a collision between a train and an automobile). 
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and more useful information than any notion about the states of mind or the 
bargaining strategies of the operators. 
D. KEEPING CONTRACT AND BEHAVIORAL EXPECTATIONS WITHIN APPROPRIATE 
BOUNDS 
Ronald Coase’s work served to establish a strong link between contract 
rights and private legal disputes. Every resource conflict becomes a bargaining 
problem. When we think of legal conflicts in terms of the cost of moving 
resources rather than simply the costs of bargaining, however, the link 
between contract bargaining and outcomes in the legal system becomes 
weaker. This is not to say that bargaining or the right to bargain is not 
important. In many situations the legal system does and should defer to 
parties’ contractual judgments rather than the objectively defined costs of 
moving resources. Buyers and sellers in competitive markets make highly 
individual choices about with whom to transact, what to buy, and how much 
to pay. People who are of age have a right to select each other for marriage, 
even if friends believe that this particular resource movement is a bad idea 
and may lead to costly redeployment in the future. 
But imagining bargains in situations where they are unnecessary, as the 
Coasean analysis sometimes does, may force people to identify particular 
solutions as desirable even though more satisfactory solutions are available. 
On the illustrative numbers given previously, the “efficient” solution to Sturges 
v. Bridgman is for Bridgman to shut down his mortar and pestle, thus 
preserving Sturges’s more valuable interest. This solution is seen as efficient 
only because we are viewing it myopically, however, within the context of a 
micromarket that the parties’ own prior decisions had created. Once we look 
at the bigger market where the services of physicians and confectioners are 
sold, then solutions emerge in which both Sturges and Bridgman can 
continue to operate. While stepping back provides opportunity for resources 
savings, however, it also opens up the universe of potential bargainers and 
makes actual bargaining much less likely. Theoretically, everyone in or about 
to go to London could bargain over the best location for each. 
But now the bargain begins to resemble a social contract rather than a 
real, executed contract. The peculiarity of social contracts is that, whatever 
their strengths as justifications for social ordering, they cannot possibly be the 
products of actual bargains involving all interested participants. The bargains 
have to be “reconstructed” through the making of more external judgments 
about who profits, by how much, what we should presume about participants’ 
attitudes about risk, and so on.47 
 
 47. For examples from diverse ideologies, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 110–12 (1985) (defending the classical 
liberal version of the Takings Clause); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 20, 370 (2014) (defending 
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Written on a smaller scale, this observation extends to a wide variety of 
circumstances, such as the proverbial smokestack industry and the downwind 
homeowners. Once affected parties with opposing interests have invested in 
their position, they become the entire market for bargaining purposes. The 
efficient solution will impose considerable costs on at least one group. But 
earlier, before their positions have been established, a range of more 
attractive solutions is available that can limit or eliminate the damage to all. 
Perhaps for this reason, more than a half-century of Coasean analysis has not 
placed a noticeable dent in the prevalence of basic zoning rules that segregate 
polluting industry from residential uses. When we think about the initial 
assignment in such settings, pairwise bargaining is not the best way to allocate 
land uses. 
When we examine the cost of traffic collisions and the cheapest way of 
avoiding them, the imaginary bargain that we use to identify who would have 
won the right of way is only a “bargain” in a metaphorical sense. Ultimately, 
these questions reduce to ones of engineering, technical ability or superiority, 
or some other factor that has nothing to do with a bargain. Deciding whether 
the train or the car should yield the right of way is fundamentally not a 
problem in bargaining. Making it into one involves many behavioral and 
transactional complexities, while giving nothing in return. 
Such solutions do limit property and contract rights to the extent that 
they forbid individuals from creating harmful externalities in the first place. 
Perhaps land occupants should have a property right or liberty of contract to 
invest in any activity and resolve externality issues later by making or imposing 
costly divestments. Or perhaps automobile drivers should have a right to drive 
on whichever side of the road they please, bargaining to yield whenever traffic 
approaches. To be sure, drivers do not own the roads and consent to traffic 
rules are a price of admission. But that answer is incomplete. One can say the 
same thing about property rights generally: someone has a right to own 
property but not a right to use it to harm others. One characteristic of most 
externalities is that they have no respect for property lines, whether it is 
Bridgman’s noisy machine or the polluter’s smoke. Accepting the Coasean 
analysis, however, entails that we have already subordinated these liberty 
rights to concerns about efficiency. 
Nontransactional costs of movement can more easily be predicted across 
categories of persons because our thinking is not complicated by the need to 
consider hypothetical bargains. For example, the emergent field of behavioral 
economics is complex, often indeterminate, and difficult for courts to apply.48 
But behavioral economics, like all other economics, is fundamentally about 
 
the classical liberal version of the social contract); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. 
ed.1999) (arguing that society has entered into a hypothetical social contract). 
 48. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
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bargaining. Often the best way to avoid these issues of indeterminacy is to 
avoid bargaining metaphors altogether. 
The domain and usefulness of behavioral law and economics are 
currently up for grabs.49 One thing that is clear, however, is that incorporating 
behaviorist assumptions into economics makes transaction analysis both more 
complex and less robust. An important way to limit the complexities that 
behavioral economics imposes is to limit the situations in which bargaining 
metaphors are required. Coase largely ignored these issues, even as he insisted 
that the problem be cast as one of bargaining. A much more direct route to 
the same result is to ignore bargaining altogether in situations where 
bargaining is unnecessary or where bargaining metaphors are unhelpful. 
IV. COASEAN MARKETS WITH MANY PLAYERS 
Economics often encounters markets with many players. Outcomes vary 
with assumptions. For example, the First Welfare Theorem (perfect 
competition) is relatively easy to prove, while strict proof of the Coase 
Theorem is very difficult. The reason is that all actors in the perfectly 
competitive market are powerless and strategic behavior is impossible. If the 
market price is P, a prospective seller can either sell or not sell, and a 
prospective buyer can either buy or not buy. The seller invariably sells if its 
willingness-to-accept (“WTA”) is less then P, and the buyer invariably buys if 
her willingness-to-pay (“WTP”) is greater than P.50 That is, there is no room 
for strategic behavior. In the Coasean situation, by contrast, the price is 
indeterminate, and one cannot conclude that a trade will be made any time 
it is jointly profitable, and certainly not in the case of three or more players. 
As a result, the proof requires significantly stronger, and perhaps more 
idiosyncratic, rationality assumptions.51 If there are three or more 
 
 49. For divergent views, see generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral 
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014) (analyzing retirement savings, 
consumer credit, and environmental protections to illustrate behavioral law and economics); 
Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of Repeated 
Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (2005) (discussing how the probability of costs and benefits 
associated with a particular choice can be addressed in the legal context); Russell Korobkin, 
Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to 
the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523 (2014) (describing the benefits and costs of 
implementing relative value health insurance); Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for 
Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653 (suggesting that theorists turn their 
attention to the value of autonomy, subjective utility, and the consequences of individual 
differences in the extent of bounded rationality); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1033 (2012) (arguing that even libertarian paternalism, the least paternalistic theory of 
behavioral law and economics, will reduce both welfare and liberty).  
 50. “Willingness-to-accept” is the lowest price a prospective seller will take; “willingness-to- 
pay” is the highest price a prospective buyer will pay. 
 51. See generally Martin Zelder, The Cost of Accosting Coase: A Reconciliatory Survey of Proofs and 
Disproofs of the Coase Theorem, in COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW 
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participants, each nonunanimous coalition can be defeated by a different 
nonunanimous coalition, and we can face a situation akin to the provision of 
a public good. Further, the comparative advantage of bargaining over 
legislation disappears. If we require stronger rationality assumptions about 
Coasean bargaining, then in order to be consistent we need to make the same 
assumptions about legislative bargaining. 
Making a trade requires at least two people, but often not more. In the 
traditional markets that have dominated classical and neoclassical economics, 
the number of people who make a trade is only a small subset of the market’s 
total participants. For example, the competitive market for bread contains 
thousands of buyers and sellers, but a trade requires only one of each, and the 
rest of the market is largely unaffected. 
Coasean markets are different because trading requires all participants 
to agree.52 Even in the two-person setting, such as Sturges and Bridgman, this 
market functions less well than a competitive market because it is a bilateral 
monopoly. Each one can trade only with the other.53 As the number of 
bargainers necessary to make a trade increases and their individual interests 
are more diverse, reaching a bargain becomes much more difficult.54 
Coasean bargaining with many players can yield cycling problems, 
although they are somewhat different from the cycling problems encountered 
in political (majority vote) markets.55 In political markets a common problem 
is that a nonunanimous but initially winning coalition can be defeated by a 
different nonunanimous coalition, as developed in Condorcet’s Paradox and 
 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 65 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998). For further reference, see also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293, 303–04 (1992) 
(discussing the assumptions required to prove the Coase Theorem). For equivalent problems in 
two-person Coasean markets, or bilateral monopolies, see generally Blair et al., supra note 34. 
 52. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63, 65 (2011). 
 53. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS 
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 238–47 (1975) (explaining the 
numerous difficulties of trading in less than competitive markets). 
 54. On the relevance of diversity to transaction costs, see generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 
(1995); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997). 
 55. On cycling problems in Coasean markets, see generally Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. 
Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. & ECON. 175 (1981); R.H. Coase, The Coase 
Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183 (1981); Hovenkamp, supra note 51. 
For more skeptical views, see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided 
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994). 
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later formalized by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.56 As a result, purely 
democratic markets can be unstable unless the vote is unanimous.57 
In the Coasean market a unanimously agreed-upon solution is stable 
because it would take another unanimous choice to change it. The cycling 
problem shows up in reaching the decision in the first place. Suppose a 
factory’s smokestack belches smoke that injures 100 homeowners but is in a 
non-nuisance jurisdiction. The homeowners must pay the smokestack if they 
want to shut it down. That payment will theoretically occur if the aggregate 
value that the homeowners place on freedom from smoke is greater than the 
value that the factory places on continued operation in that location. But how 
will the payment be divided among the homeowners? A coalition of the most 
nearby homeowners may agree on an equal payment for everyone, but more 
remote homeowners will object that they are injured less by the smoke and 
thus place a lower value on its removal. Or those who have property interests 
that are less valuable or less vulnerable to smoke damage will argue that 
payments should be proportioned to provable harm. Or some homeowners 
may object that the prevailing winds force the smoke into a path that injures 
some homeowners more than others. The result could be an endless set of 
proposals, coalitions, and counterproposals, with no proposal ever achieving 
the unanimous consent that is needed. 
The same thing could happen in a nuisance jurisdiction where the value 
of operating the factory is greater than the injury to the homeowners. In that 
case the factory would be willing to compensate the homeowners, but only 
after they agree on how the compensation should be divided. The same 
problems emerge. Any proposed agreement could be defeated by an 
alternative proposed agreement. 
One might be tempted to say that the problem of reaching and 
maintaining efficient outcomes in many-player Coasean markets is one of 
transaction costs. These costs may become higher, even insurmountable, in 
markets that have large numbers of participants and that give rise to the 
formation of alternative coalitions. The issue is more complex than that, 
however. If bargaining were literally costless, it would go on forever. A rational 
 
 56. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1963). On the Theorem’s relation to governance, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s 
Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990). On voting cycles in 
democratic nonunanimous decision making, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 72–78 
(2003). 
 57. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 38–39 (1991). See generally Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1073 (2010) (discussing cycling in legislative contexts); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and 
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988) (discussing cycling in legislative processes). On the 
implications of Condorcet’s paradox on democratic institutions, particularly where preferences 
are not naked but are arrayed around specific policies or ideologies, see generally WILLIAM V. 
GEHRLEIN & DOMINIQUE LEPELLEY, VOTING PARADOXES AND GROUP COHERENCE: THE 
CONDORCET EFFICIENCY OF VOTING RULES (2011). 
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decision maker would continue to bargain as long as the expected value of 
improving one’s position exceeded the cost of continuing to bargain, which 
would be zero. Under zero-cost bargaining any possibility of an improvement 
would yield a further offer. Indeed, in such situations it is more likely that 
positive, although manageable, bargaining costs serve to induce equilibrium 
by making continued bargaining costly.58 
One possible solution to the cycling problem is a damages rule rather 
than an injunction rule. For example, suppose that 100 homeowners object 
to a smokestack. Their individual damages are diverse but the aggregate is 
$1000. The value of operating the smokestack is $1200, so it is willing to pay 
the $1000. An injunction rule might yield infinite cycling, but under a 
damage rule a third party such as a jury could assess the loss to each 
homeowner, who would then be forced to accept that amount in lieu of an 
injunction. Coase himself once observed that switching to damage rules in 
such cases could prevent cycling.59 The result, however, is to give the 
smokestack something akin to the power of eminent domain.60 In any event, 
the harm is done, and the damages must be paid only because the 
homeowners and the smokestack were permitted to move into such close 
proximity in the first place. Prohibiting this could have made both an 
injunction and damages unnecessary by preventing the harm altogether. 
An additional feature of the damages rule is that in most situations 
bargaining or bargaining analogies are no longer part of the solution. For 
most injuries damages rules turn into a variation of the “cheapest cost avoider” 
problem with respect to automobile accidents61 by substituting engineering 
or objective resource movement costs for bargaining. For example, if the 
smoke pollution is injuring a downwind homeowner’s roses, the relevant 
question becomes the market value of the ruined roses, replacement costs, or 
something akin to that. We no longer care about parties’ bargaining strategies 
or, in most cases, even their subjective values. 
A. THE PUBLIC GOODS CHARACTER OF MANY-PLAYER COASEAN MARKETS 
Coase himself recognized the problem of bargaining in markets with 
large numbers of players. He was particularly concerned with smoke 
pollution, writing about it in both his 1959 article on the Federal 
Communications Commission and a year later in The Problem of Social Cost. 
One can speculate that his interest resulted from his earlier life in heavily-
 
 58. Coase’s response was that determining what would happen under zero transaction costs 
is simply “without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive 
transaction costs.” Coase, supra note 55, at 187. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 
YALE L.J. 2091, 2112 (1997) (noting application of a damages rule as one difference between 
eminent domain and voluntary transactions). 
 61. See supra Part III.C. 
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polluted London. In The Federal Communications Commission, Coase observed 
that “[w]hen large numbers of people are involved, the argument for the 
institution of property rights is weakened and that for general regulations 
becomes stronger.”62 Speaking of smoke pollution in particular, he 
acknowledged that “if many people are harmed and there are several sources 
of pollution, it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory solution through the 
market.”63 As a result, “[i]n these circumstances it may be preferable to 
impose special regulations . . . .”64 
In The Problem of Social Cost a year later, Coase returned to smoke 
pollution.65 Interestingly, his most extensive discussion was of Bryant v. Lefever, 
a dispute between a single defendant and a single plaintiff. Coase himself 
acknowledged that the situation was “novel.”66 The nuisance dispute arose 
when the defendant rebuilt his house, giving it a higher roofline that 
prevented the plaintiff’s chimney from clearing its smoke.67 Coase later 
addressed “the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast 
number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities.”68 Coase conceded 
that private bargaining might not be able to determine the result and that we 
might wish to call upon the government as a “super-firm” to solve the 
problem.69 
Coase also discussed the problem of railroad trains that throw sparks 
from their engines, sometimes causing fires on nearby land.70 The relevant 
cost to the individual landowners is the probability that a fire will occur on 
their property multiplied by the expected amount of damage. The relevant 
cost to the railroads is the cost of minimizing the sparks, perhaps by 
proceeding more slowly or installing spark-suppressing technology or 
switching fuels, or perhaps even by ceasing operation or relocating. 
A single railroad line might pass by hundreds of landowners, and a deal 
with any one of them will not bind the others. Suppose that the cost of 
eliminating the sparks is less than the risk-adjusted cost of expected injury to 
the landowners. In a well-functioning Coasean market the parties would 
bargain to a solution in which the railroad eliminated the sparks by some 
means. If the parties are in a nuisance jurisdiction the outcome is fairly simple: 
no deal will result. The most the railroad is willing to pay will be less than the 
 
 62. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29 (1959). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. See Coase, supra note 1, at 1–2, 11–13. 
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. Id. The Bryant court used the type of “wrongdoer” analysis that Coase rejected—namely 
that while making smoke and injuring a neighbor might be a nuisance, in this case the plaintiff 
was being injured by his own smoke. Id. at 12. 
 68. Id. at 17. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See id. at 29. 
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value the landowners place on being free from the risk imposed by the sparks. 
The railroad will have to take whichever avoidance mechanism is effective and 
cheapest. 
But what if the parties are in a no-nuisance jurisdiction? The landowners 
will have to pay off the railroad. We can assume that the gross amount of the 
payment is easy to compute because it applies to the railroad alone. For 
example, if effective spark-arresting technology costs $1 million, the railroad 
would accept any amount in excess of that. But how is the payment to be 
divided up among the, say, 1000 landowners adjoining the tracks? First, they 
are very likely quite diverse. Some have grazing land adjoining the tracks, 
making the expected cost of spark-induced fire relatively small. Others may 
have assets that are easily and cheaply moved further from the tracks.71 Others 
may have houses or other buildings close by, and for them the expected cost 
of a fire will be much greater. Some may have 100 feet of frontage along the 
tracks while others have 500 feet, greatly increasing their exposure. Some may 
be in a direction that is persistently upwind while others are downwind. Some 
may be in areas where trains travel or accelerate much more than in other 
areas, and thus emit more sparks. 
The result will be either underinvestment in efficient technologies or 
activities, or else a great deal of negotiating and cycling through various 
alternatives. For example, the landowners may form coalitions whose 
members can be siphoned off by alternative coalitions. Small owners might 
agree to pay $500 each, leaving large landowners with $5000. But then a 
subgroup of the large landowners might reform as a coalition of those having 
houses along the tracks, asking others to join them and offering $4000 each. 
In such a situation Coasean bargaining under a unanimous-consent rule 
can turn into endless cycling with no agreement ever being reached. The story 
is a little like Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, where numerous potential heirs 
and devisees contested a will, each asking for more than someone else or 
trying to exclude others until the entire estate was consumed by litigation 
costs.72 The parties would have been much better off if they had been able to 
agree, but an agreement would have required unanimous consent among all 
of those with a colorable claim.73 
Each landowner will have a tendency to understate his exposure, thus 
making his share of the payment smaller. In addition, each landowner knows 
 
 71. E.g., LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340, 341 (1914) 
(discussing how landowner’s injury from railroad sparks was from stacks of straw that were 
positioned very close to the track); see also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior: 
Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 37 (1988). 
 72. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Signet Classics 2003) (1853).  
 73. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 202–03 (2000); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the 
State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 7 (1985) (describing property disputes among multiple 
actors in a “state of nature”). 
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that once the spark arrester is installed it will benefit everyone, so they may be 
able to get away without paying anything at all.74 That is to say, the many-player 
Coasean market effectively becomes a market for a public good in the sense 
that a costly but efficient fix, once installed, benefits the entire affected 
population. The railroad cannot insist on individual payment by selectively 
denying protection. At the same time, however, each landowner has an 
incentive to understate the value of the interest in question.75 
To be sure, the available solutions might be diverse, with some 
resembling public goods more than others. For example, the railroad might 
accept compensation in order to run more slowly alongside the farms of 
payors, even decreasing its speed as they pay more. In that case it might be 
able to bargain with each landowner individually. If it installs the spark-
arresting technology, however, all landowners will be protected, whether they 
pay or not. The first solution may be superior from a bargaining standpoint, 
while the second may be superior technologically. 
It also does not add much to say that efficient outcomes will emerge when 
gainers from a certain rule can compensate the losers, who stand to lose less 
than the gainers gain. If actual bargains were at issue, the recipients would 
still have to agree with each other about how the compensation is to be 
divided, or the payors would have to agree on the size of each person’s 
obligation. The same cycling problems re-enter.76 
Coase himself recognized the public goods character of some Coasean 
markets. In his article The Lighthouse in Economics, he noted a history in which 
lighthouses were privately financed with harbor taxes charged against ships 
who came and went.77 But Coase never adequately addressed the problem of 
ships that simply passed by, benefitting from the lighthouse but not required 
to pay the tax. The lighthouses were never really private, and to the extent 
 
 74. On whether the problem of nonpayment by free riders is a “transaction cost,” see 
HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 116–17 (2008) (arguing that the cost of free riders is an 
ownership cost rather than a transaction cost). 
 75. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY 
IT MATTERS 49–50 (2000) (discussing the public goods problem in some Coasean markets). 
 76. But see generally Francesco Parisi, Political Coase Theorem, 115 PUB. CHOICE 1 (2003) 
(arguing that Coasean markets with zero transaction costs, single-peaked preferences, and side 
payments could yield stable outcomes). In most cases, including the illustrations discussed in the 
text, the preferences of individual landowners are not single-peaked because they divide into 
different categories that cannot be arrayed along a single line. For example, if the only variable 
was each landowner’s distance from a smokestack, the array of preferences might be single-
peaked. But different landowners might also be engaged in different types of activity that is more 
or less harmed by smoke, and this array might be uncorrelated with distance from the smokestack. 
Another array might be correlated with prevailing wind direction, or the nature of the assets at 
risk. The aggregation of these preference sets is not single-peaked. In any event, bargaining 
depends on declared willingness to pay or accept, not on objective measurement of cost or profit. 
If we use the latter, then we are no longer relying on a bargaining metaphor. 
 77. R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360–61 (1974). 
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they were, they failed.78 In any event, the harbor tax was assessed by a 
government agency or its equivalent. 
Bargaining problems in many-player Coasean markets have numerous 
real world manifestations. One example is the previously discussed issue of 
whether land uses are best allocated legislatively through the zoning system 
or else by private bargaining. In the first two decades after The Problem of Social 
Cost was published, several writers advocated private restrictive covenants as 
efficient alternatives to legislative zoning.79 Pairwise resolution of disputes 
among people who have already made their investments is always suboptimal, 
however, if the investments themselves are suboptimal and extraction is costly. 
If we want maximizing solutions—the kind where both uses can coexist—then 
we must identify the problems before the conflict arises. This entails a system 
more like the one for traffic rules, which focuses on the entire area in which 
resource conflicts arise, on classes of users rather than individuals, and on the 
overall costs of moving resources. In general, the more costly it is to move or 
redeploy a poorly located resource (such as a smokestack), the greater the 
value in getting it right the first time. Zoning and subdivision servitude 
decisions typically involve questions such as how far commercial and 
noncommercial uses should be separated from one another, whether 
polluting or noise producing industry should be segregated, whether to have 
separate professional and industrial parks, how to consider commuting costs 
in locating residential and commercial areas, and so on. Assuming we can 
predict with at least minimal accuracy, the costs of making the right decisions 
before investment occurs are almost certain to be significantly lower than the 
later costs of extraction from badly made decisions. 
B. EXCESSIVE CYCLING OR EXCESSIVE STABILITY? 
Even when unanimous consent is initially achieved, Coasean bargaining 
rules are suboptimal when they make it more difficult to respond to changed 
circumstances. Rules initially established by unanimous consent might later 
become inefficient. If unanimous consent is required to change them, 
however, there will be holdouts that prevent the change from taking place. 
That is, the Coasean market then produces excessive stability, which makes 
such rules particularly troublesome in changing markets. 
 
 78. See Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities, 30 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 389, 390 (2006). 
 79. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 77–84 (1972); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 681, 711–19 (1973); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise 
Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 66 (1981); Robert H. Nelson, Contracting for Land Use 
Law: Zoning by Private Contract, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 157, 171–73 (F. 
H. Buckley ed., 1999); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning 
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828–29 
(1999).  
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Excessive stability has proven to be a significant problem in subdivisions 
where land uses are governed mainly by restrictive covenants, easements, or 
other servitudes. Some residential subdivisions have attempted to solve this 
problem by permitting nonunanimous voting to change an existing 
restriction that is no longer desirable.80 But switching to nonunanimous rules 
simply substitutes one cycling problem for another. The nonunanimous rules 
have all the defects of democratic voting systems generally.81 As a result, the 
courts have frequently had to intervene to protect minority rights. For 
example, several courts have held that even where a set of restrictions permit 
changes by less than unanimous voting, unanimity would be required for a 
proposed change that would affect only a single lot in the subdivision.82 
One alternative approach is to re-conceptualize the problem of multi-
player bargaining as a time series of pairwise contracts. That is what frequently 
happens when residential subdivisions are initially developed. The developer 
draws up a list of land use restrictions for a particular subdivision, typically by 
making an economic prediction concerning the uses that will maximize 
subdivision value—a prediction, incidentally, that is based on externally 
measured assessments of value rather than actual willingness-to-pay. The 
developer then places these restrictions into the chain of title and sells the 
homes individually, with each buyer agreeing to the restrictions. Once the 
restrictions are in place and buyers have begun to purchase, acceptance of 
the restrictions is largely mandatory—take them or leave them. This avoids 
the problem of dozens or hundreds of homeowners having to bargain at once. 
This “vertical” series of pairwise transactions must eventually turn into a 
 
 80. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller’s Landing, L.L.C., 29 So. 3d 228, 235 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) 
(concluding that a rule permitting less than unanimous consent to amend a restriction is subject 
to a judicially enforced reasonableness test); Brown v. Martin, 794 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2010) (considering a provision permitting amendment of the covenant by less than 
unanimous vote in certain circumstances); Lake Wauwanoka, Inc. v. Spain, 622 S.W.2d 309, 311 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining the subdivision’s rule that allowed a majority of the residents to 
amend a covenant); Lawton v. Schwartz, 308 P.3d 1033, 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (examining 
rules that allowed 75% of owners in a community to change the restrictive covenant); Estates at 
Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736, 745 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) 
(considering the validity of a rule requiring unanimous consent to amend a covenant during the 
first 25 years of its creation, but permitting  less than unanimous decisions thereafter).  
 81. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Bargaining in Coasian Markets: Servitudes and Alternative 
Land Use Controls, 27 J. CORP. L. 519 (2002) (arguing that zoning has an advantage over private 
bargaining); Neal Kumar Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990 (2013) (reviewing 
JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012)); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988) (discussing 
the disadvantages of public intervention in servitudes); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of 
Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615 (1985) (proposing the 
changed conditions doctrine be limited to situations where unanimous consent is required for 
modifications). 
 82. See, e.g., Licker v. Harkleroad, 558 S.E.2d 31, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Walton v. 
Jaskiewicz, 563 A.2d 382, 386 (Md. 1989); Maatta v. Dead River Campers, Inc., 689 N.W. 2d 491, 
498 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).  
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“horizontal” arrangement among the homeowners, who eventually take it 
over and operate it themselves under contract rules. By that time the 
servitudes are already in place.83 It would be as if Sturges and Bridgman had 
been obligated before making their purchase (or lease) to agree to a covenant 
restricting the use of noisy machinery. If such a covenant had been in place 
Bridgman would presumably have decided to go elsewhere, where his 
machinery would not interfere with Sturgis’ stethoscope. 
However, this approach would not solve the problem of servitudes that 
no longer serve their social purpose. We can still expect post-agreement 
hyperstability. Restrictions remain enforceable even after they serve to reduce 
rather than increase value. For example, if a neighborhood subject to 
residence-only restrictions has changed and surrounding areas have gone 
commercial, a significant majority may wish to profit by selling off their 
property for commercial use. But a small number, perhaps those in the 
interior, want to maintain the residential restrictions because they like where 
they are living and the surrounding, similarly restricted homeowners provide 
a buffer.84 In such cases the courts have sometimes provided relief, but of 
course in so doing they are imposing a judicial judgment that conflicts with 
the contract-based judgment of the homeowners, and often where there is no 
obvious injury to outsiders.85 
C. FRACTURED MARKETS AND THE OPTIMAL SOURCE OF REGULATION 
Another difference between servitude rules and zoning rules is domain. 
Both private restriction systems and legislative systems can be subject to 
fracture, but private restrictions are more prone to the problem. The 
boundaries of subdivisions or other private residential developments such as 
condominiums are often drawn too small to encompass the areas over which 
resource conflicts arise. Subdivision boundaries are not only smaller than 
municipal boundaries, but they are often a function of nothing more than 
previous ownership of a parcel of land. For example, a developer might 
 
 83. The developer typically has the power to enforce the servitudes as long as it owns at least 
one protected lot in the subdivision; but once it has sold the last lot, it no longer has standing. See 
Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Ass’n v. W. Pac. Hous., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41, 49–50 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that developers lacked standing because they “no longer ha[d] an 
interest in the land”). Some cases are less specific, permitting the developer to retain control for a 
“reasonable time” to fulfill its marketing efforts. Barclay v. DeVeau, 429 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Mass. 
1981).  
 84. See, e.g., Redfern Lawns Civic Ass’n v. Currie Pontiac Co., 44 N.W.2d 8, 11–12 (Mich. 
1950) (refusing to apply the changed conditions doctrine to grant relief from a servitude where 
maintenance of a single-family home restriction operated as a buffer benefitting interior lots); 
Matthews v. Winstanley, No. 242472, 2003 WL 22976411, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2003) 
(refusing to set aside a deed restriction where the character of the neighborhood had changed 
substantially). 
 85. For a critique, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law 
of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982). 
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acquire the “Smith farm” in order to subdivide it for residential purposes. But 
the boundaries of the Smith farm have little to do with prevailing patterns of 
air or water movement, traffic, noise, congestion, or any of the other harmful 
effects that zoning is designed to address. Further, because servitudes are 
contractual, the only people who can enforce them are typically those who 
were parties to a contract or an estate in the encumbered land. For example, 
a lot owner in the Smith farm subdivision will very likely have standing to 
assert the no-smokestack covenant against another lot owner in that same 
subdivision, but she will not be able to enforce the restriction against a 
landowner across the street who is not part of the subdivision.86 
Zoning by small communities can be subject to these problems as well, 
but in that case regional or statewide land-use regulation can be stacked above 
it so as to encompass larger markets.87 This simply reflects the principle that 
the entity imposing a regulation should be geographically large enough to 
encompass the entire market that is being regulated. Otherwise we can expect 
self-dealing and myopic decision making.88 
D. EX ANTE AND EX POST DECISION MAKING: EFFICIENCY AND THE LONG RUN 
Using the nuisance case of Sturges v. Bridgman as one illustration, Coase’s 
social cost analysis identified the efficient solution as the one where the higher 
value activity is preferred while the lower value activity is shut down or perhaps 
ameliorated.89 As noted previously, this solution is “efficient” only if we 
confine our analysis to the micro-market involving Sturges and Bridgman, 
which is often smaller than the markets in which the parties’ activities 
 
 86. See, e.g., Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd. P’ship, 862 P.2d 1048, 1063 (Haw. 
1993) (holding that a property owner across the street from a height-restricted subdivision could 
not enforce the restriction even if he was injured); see also Shaff v. Leyland, 914 A.2d 1240, 1245 
(N.H. 2006) (holding that a person who no longer owned property in a subdivision could not 
enforce a covenant restricting the number and architectural nature of the subdivision’s homes); 
Santa Fe Estates, Inc. v. Concerned Residents of Santa Fe N., Inc., 207 P.3d 1143, 1147 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that a group of interested citizens who were not landowners in the subdivision 
could not enforce the subdivision’s restrictions); Stegall v. Hous. Auth. of Charlotte, 178 S.E.2d 824, 
829 (N.C. 1971) (holding that a person who did not own a lot in a subdivision could not enforce 
the subdivision’s single-family home restriction); Lakewood Racquet Club, Inc. v. Jensen, 232 P.3d 
1147, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that once a property had been sold, the previous 
owner’s heirs could no longer enforce the covenant). 
 87. On “stacking” as a fix for institutional fracture, see infra Part VI. 
 88. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad 
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1044–45, 1070 (1988) (discussing the dispute over state versus federal 
regulation of the American railroad system). On the fracturing problem in zoning, see generally 
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1115 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp & John 
A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985). 
 89. See supra Part II. 
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operate.90 Once we look at the broader market for confectioning, doctoring, 
or small business generally, then we may be able to produce solutions in which 
both activities can continue without harming one another. In order to do that 
we would need to consider all of the costs of moving resources, not merely 
those that are involved in transacting. We must also examine the longer run, 
because an important part of the cost of moving resources is correcting for 
previous mistakes. In most situations the optimal course is to put them into 
the correct place to begin with. 
Blum and Kalven were correct in 1964 that pairwise bargaining would 
not work as between two automobiles facing an impending collision.91 
Calabresi responded with a solution that re-focused the automobile accident 
question on the entire market in which such collisions likely are to occur.92 
Because bargaining is possible between neighbors with stable relationships 
and predictable disputes, Coase was able to focus on tiny markets that told us 
a great deal about bargaining but said little about optimal allocations of 
resources in the greater markets in which these activities occurred. The truly 
efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman problem requires broadening our 
vision to take into account the entire set of market choices that these two 
people faced before they made their investments in a particular location. That 
necessarily includes a much larger area that encompasses both of their uses, 
as well as a longer period of time. In the process, we will have involved a much 
greater number of persons and greater diversity of interests in the negotiating 
process. 
As between two parties in a resource conflict, the person who places the 
greater value on a right after interests are in place is not necessarily the one 
who would have valued it most highly before he moved in. For example, our 
hypothetical numbers assumed that Sturges’s use of his stethoscope was more 
valuable than Bridgman’s use of his mechanical mortar and pestle. However, 
looking ex ante it may also be true that relocating Bridgman’s bulky candy 
manufacturing equipment is much more costly than relocating Sturges’s 
lightweight stethoscope. In addition to assuming that Sturges valued use of 
his stethoscope at £100 while Bridgman valued use of his mortar and pestle 
at £60, suppose that it would cost Sturges only £25 to relocate while it would 
cost Bridgman £40. In that case a more efficient outcome occurs when Sturges 
moves and both parties continue their operations. If the jurisdiction finds a 
nuisance, Bridgman will have to pay Sturges to move. If there is no nuisance 
Sturges must pay his own moving costs. While professionals often have highly 
valuable occupations, they also frequently have fairly mobile assets. The cost 
 
 90. See Williamson, supra note 53, at 24 (noting the partial equilibrium nature of Coasean 
analysis). 
 91. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 41, at 700. 
 92. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 135 & n.1. 
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of moving a law office might be considerably less than the cost of re-locating 
a cement production plant.93 
The most efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman problem is to 
allocate property rights in such a way that the problem never arises in the first 
place. Then we can have both confectioners and physicians. This means that 
the initial position must be one from which further movement is least likely 
to be necessary. For example, if we can assign Sturges’s right to a place where 
he will be free to practice without interference we would have the social value 
of his activity, or £100. If we can do the same thing with Bridgman we will also 
have the social value of his activity, or £60. Making such decisions, however, 
almost always requires looking beyond Sturges and Bridgman. While each 
building has only one actual owner, it may have a very large number of 
potential owners. One relatively private approach to the problem would be a 
set of servitudes that segregated business activities by the amount of 
interference that they caused. For example, relatively noisy activities such as 
confectioning could be assigned to one land area, while professional activities 
such as practicing medicine could be assigned to a different area. This could 
only happen in a relatively large subdivision, however. It would thus place us 
in territory that involves multi-player negotiating and all of the problems 
attending such markets, as discussed above. 
At this point subjective bargaining analogies fail us, but there are 
alternatives. The Arrovian theory predicting endless cycling in many political, 
majority rule markets assumed “naked” voter preferences that were 
noncomparable from one actor to another.94 But identification of the 
“cheapest cost avoider” in accident law makes no such assumption. Instead of 
inferring “preferences,” as bargaining theory does, it looks directly at the 
problem of the cost of moving resources, typically focusing on engineering 
costs, health costs, productivity, or other factors that can be estimated directly 
from market prices without using individual preference as a surrogate. For 
example, making cars stop rather than trains is not a matter of assessing the 
preferences of drivers and engineers, but rather of doing a cost-benefit 
analysis of different assignments of the obligation to stop. 
V. MANAGING FRACTURE THROUGH DEFAULT RULES 
Default rules can provide a presumptive solution to resource conflicts but 
then permit parties in individual settings to select a different arrangement. 
They are particularly useful when the “gross” rules for a particular situation 
are relatively clear and common, but finer rules require more individualized 
decisions. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that title to 
goods passes when the goods are delivered, but permits the parties to agree 
 
 93. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) (using nuisance law to 
address cement plant pollution where relocation was costly). 
 94. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 56. 
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to an alternative.95 One defense of such a rule is that it takes the issue of title 
passage off the table for the great majority of covered bargains, but permits 
parties to bargain around the rule when an alternative increases net value. A 
well-designed default rule assigns the right so that it creates the greater value 
in most situations (or situations producing the greatest value), making 
bargaining unnecessary. It then permits the parties to bargain around the 
default whenever the values are switched. Default provisions are particularly 
important in situations where the parties must bargain but high transaction 
costs, risk aversion, or an endowment effect obstructs trading to a higher 
value.96 
Because common law rules permit settlements, default rules are 
ubiquitous in any regime where private common law governs legal outcomes. 
But they can also be valuable in a mixed regime of regulation and private 
ordering. In addition, they protect individual autonomy by giving people both 
the choice to act as they wish but a certain amount of state control in situations 
where the social value of a particular outcome is high but individual costs are 
relatively small. That is, they serve to soften the paternalism of more heavy 
handed regulation. 
Much of the literature on default rules has been concerned with contract 
law, and their relevance in contractual situations is obvious. For commercial 
contracts in particular, default rules serve to fill in the gaps when contracts 
are incomplete. When the gap is explicitly filled in, however, the default gives 
way to the parties’ expressed preferences.97 Default rules exist in many other 
legal settings, however, quite aside from contract law. Construction of legal 
documents, statutes, regulatory choices, and even the Constitution also 
involve default rules that apply mainly when language is ambiguous or 
incomplete.98 For example, Chief Justice Taney’s famous conclusion in the 
Charles River Bridge case that in grants from the government “nothing passes 
 
 95. U.C.C. § 2-401 (2012). 
 96. See generally Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, supra note 31. For 
additional discussion, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 613–17 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 106, 110–12 (2002). 
 97. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
 98. See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION (2008); Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 396, 429 (2009) (arguing that applying default rules in contracts is a distributive task); Bubb 
& Pildes, supra note 49, at 1628–30 (considering default rules in the context of retirement 
programs); Gillian E. Metzger, Congressional Authority and Constitutional Default Rules in the 
Horizontal Federalism Context, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST ADVOCACY 101 (Kathleen Claussen et al., eds., 2008), available at http://www.law. 
yale.edu/why_the_local_matters_final_122109.pdf; Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, 
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127 
(2014); Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Cooperation, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1403 (2007).  
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by implication,” writes a default rule into the Constitution’s Contract Clause: 
a grant of land or a franchise from the state does not include a monopoly 
right unless the granting language does so explicitly.99 
The Coase Theorem assumes default rules to the extent that common 
law rules create alienable entitlements.100 The invariance thesis states that in 
a zero transaction-cost world assignment of the default does not matter.101 For 
example, whether or not Bridgman’s mortar and pestle is declared a nuisance, 
the parties will bargain to the more efficient result. Default rules can matter, 
however, when the costs of bargaining are greater than the bargaining space, 
or the different valuations placed by the two parties. For example, if Sturges 
values the right to be free from Bridgeman’s thumping by £100 while 
Bridgman values use of the machine at £60, the parties may not be able to 
agree on the efficient result if transaction costs exceed £40. 
Traditional command-and-control regulation takes market choices away 
from individuals. Assuming that the regulation is well designed, this removal 
of market choice can be justified by generalizations from large numbers. For 
example, the rationale for a regulation that forbids anyone from conducting 
a business in a suburban area zoned R-1, or residential-only, is that the 
affected group as a whole is better off. Further, the statute accomplishes this 
much more efficiently than large numbers of conflict resolutions among 
disputing neighbors, particularly when we include the costs of extraction from 
previous mistakes.102 Default rules may also be inappropriate when the 
purpose of the regulation is to protect someone from the market itself. For 
example, suppose the minimum wage were a default rule. By default people 
must be paid at least $7.50 per hour, unless they agree to a lower amount. 
The effect could be the same as if there were no minimum wage statute at all. 
While legislation typically operates at a macro level, affecting large 
numbers of people, default rules often operate at a “micro” level. For 
example, the default rules developed in the Uniform Commercial Code apply 
to a very large number of commercial contracts. Deviating from them, 
however, typically requires an agreement between a single seller and a single 
buyer. 
Default rules look less like “default” rules and more like absolute rules as 
the costs of defaulting increase. These costs can be either transactional or 
nontransactional. For example, once the smokestack and the homeowners are 
in place, a default rule declaring that the smokestack is not a nuisance may be 
absolute to the extent that (1) reaching an agreement among the multiple 
parties is costly; or (2) relocating the smokestack is costly. The first is a cost of 
 
 99. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 
420, 546 (1837); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 
110–14 (1991). 
 100. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
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transacting; the second is simply a cost of relocating a heavy and specialized 
installation that was built in the wrong place. 
A. DEFAULT RULES FOR DIFFERENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
The idea of default rules is that in appropriate circumstances people can 
bargain around them.103 When markets are unimportant, however, because 
resources are being allocated in some other way, default rules may be 
unimportant as well. 
The theory of private default rules has not done an adequate job of 
differentiating their use in different institutional settings. A complete theory 
of private default rules must address three distinct issues. First, how should 
the legal policy maker select a default rule? Second, when should the rule be 
default and when should it be absolute? Third, what kind of bargaining 
coalition is needed to reverse the default? 
1. The Selection of a Default Rule 
The proper default rule should reflect a reality that occurs in the great 
majority of cases, or that produces the greatest value, but where socially 
valuable deviations are likely to occur when people intentionally deviate from 
the default. One good candidate is to place liability on the “cheapest cost 
avoider.” That rule does a reasonably good job of predicting who would have 
won the entitlement in a well-functioning market. To the extent that common 
technologies have similar costs, rules that place liability on the “cheapest cost 
avoider” should increase social value most of the time. Another good 
candidate is “first in time is first in right,” or the rule that priority of possession 
determines title. Another is that during the period after a land sale contract 
has been executed but before delivery of the deed the risk of loss is on the 
party in possession.104 
A good default rule also should be able to reduce bad outcomes when 
transaction costs are sufficiently high that the parties would not be able to 
negotiate around the default. But a good default rule also reduces the 
deadweight loss of transaction costs even when the parties could bargain to 
an efficient alternative. For example, if Sturges values the right to be free of 
Bridgman’s noise by £100 while Bridgman values the right to make it by £60, 
the parties might be able to negotiate to the efficient result even if the law 
improperly assigned the right to Bridgman, provided that transaction costs 
are less than £40. For example, executing a real covenant forbidding 
 
 103. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1175 (2003); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF 
GOVERNMENT 101–04 (2013); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 85–87 (Penguin Books rev. ed. 2009) 
(2008); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 
1826, 1882 (2013).  
 104. See infra text accompanying note 117. 
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Bridgman from operating his mortar and pestle might cost only £35. But that 
£35 is a pure deadweight loss if the law could accomplish that result ex ante 
and at no cost. Here, as in other areas, getting it right the first time saves 
resources. 
Even when transaction costs are very low, default rules might serve to 
address behavioral issues, including inertia and limitations on perspective. 
One of the insights of behavioral economics in this area is that, while 
transaction costs certainly impose inertia, they are not the only source of 
inertia. The question is, how should this affect policy? Any cost of movement 
is a “cost,” whether or not it involves a transaction.105 Often no more than a 
very small cost is necessary to deter a person from changing her position. The 
problem with many common law approaches to conflict is that their after-the-
fact nature induces people to make conflict-producing choices first and 
extract themselves later. Extraction is less likely as the costs, whether 
transactional or otherwise, become higher. 
The writing on behavioral economics observes that certain forms of 
inertia cannot be explained by “transaction costs.” For example, when 
employers adopt “opt out” rather than “opt in” rules for retirement plans, 
participation rates are significantly higher even though transaction costs are 
low.106 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler give the example of the cafeteria 
that puts the dessert in a more remote place than the vegetables.107 This “soft 
paternalism” may in fact induce people to consume more vegetables and less 
dessert. We can assume that “transaction” costs are zero because nothing is 
being transacted, but the choice nevertheless imposes other types of costs, just 
as when the grocery store places staples such as milk and bread in the back, 
making customers walk through the high margin snacks and sweets. These 
costs typically have nothing to do with markets. Rather they are embedded in 
the human psyche, instincts, perceptions or other limitations. 
Decisions that are given effect “internally” can be just as costly as 
decisions that are made on a market—a point that Coase illustrated in The 
Nature of the Firm.108 Behavioral economics often has much less to do with 
human evolution or irrationality than with the fact that even completely 
nontransactional behavior imposes a cost. The hard thing is making sense of 
preferences that are never exercised on a market. 
When we want a certain outcome it may not matter all that much what 
the source of a cost really is. Opt-in versus opt-out rules for retirement plans 
is a good example. The employer presumably puts some resources into 
determining a plan that is best for its own employees as a general matter, 
 
 105. See supra Part II. 
 106. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 49, at 1609. 
 107. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 103, at 1166. 
 108. Coase, supra note 10, at 394–96. See generally Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 
39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). 
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assesses the presumptive contribution, but then gives employees the 
opportunity to opt out. At that point, it may not matter so much whether the 
choice to stay with the default is a consequence of transaction costs, costs of 
movement, or some “irrational” behavioral characteristic such as inertia. 
As noted above, default rules are intended for situations where we can 
identify the high-value user, or the person who would have won a hypothetical 
bargain, on a “class” basis. One possible approach is to consider what most of 
the relevant parties would want or what they would want most of the time. For 
example, the employer might ask employees to vote on whether they want 
money withheld for a retirement plan by default. If the majority votes yes, then 
withholding will be presumptive but employees will still be able to opt out 
individually. Majoritarian default rules in contract settings operate in this 
way.109 
If our goal is to maximize value, however, the majoritarian approach can 
give the wrong result if parties’ individual valuations are unequal. Consider 
the example of the non-default grade crossing rule, which gives trains the 
right of way. Undoubtedly many more cars than trains drive through railroad 
grade crossings. Simply taking a vote among automobile drivers and train 
operators would give the right of way to cars. By contrast, the “cheapest cost 
avoider” approach weighs cars and trains differently by focusing on the cost 
of stopping rather than the number of vehicles that must be stopped. In other 
cases, where the opposing interests are randomized or more equally weighted, 
majoritarian default rules may be an efficient way of allocating initial 
assignments. For example, if the interests of buyers and sellers are more or 
less equally weighty, then the majority rule linking risk of loss to passage of 
title is much more likely to be the appropriate default. 
As a class, it costs more to stop trains than to stop individual cars,110 but 
there can be exceptions. Perhaps a particular train has only two cars and is 
travelling empty, while 60 automobiles are approaching the track from two 
different directions. Or one of the vehicles might be an ambulance with a 
patient in need of emergency care. In such cases it might be much cheaper to 
stop the train than the cars. But the transaction costs of identifying these 
situations in time and reversing the rule would be very high. Busy grade 
crossings typically have warning signals and even gates that descend to block 
automobiles, but this technology is unable to choose who gets the right of way 
by assessing the comparative cost of stopping. Traffic lights with inductive 
loop detectors do a highly simplified version of this, parsing out green or red 
lights depending on where the device detects traffic. In general, however, 
their ability to do this is limited to the “binary” situation where the cost of 
 
 109. For differing views of the nature and merits of majoritarian default rules, see generally 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999); 
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 
(2003).  
 110. See supra Part III.C. 
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stopping from one side is zero, because it does not detect any cars in that 
lane.111 
In other situations “class” identification of the “cheapest cost avoider” is 
even less likely and individual analysis is needed. For example, in Sturges v. 
Bridgman it is easy to say that if we want to avoid bargaining costs we should 
assign the interest to the person who values it most. But this requires a 
particularized evaluation of each party’s situation. This explains why the 
common law of nuisance has always been fairly nontheoretical and fact 
specific.112 We can chop off a few uses at one end of the spectrum as clearly 
nuisances “per se,” and some at the other end as clearly non-nuisances. But 
most cases in the middle require individual analysis, which we usually 
accomplish by balancing either utilities or values through negotiation or 
litigation.113 
The Restatement of Torts has incorporated a version of this approach since 
it was first published in 1939, making a nontrespassory activity that injures 
another’s land a nuisance “unless the utility of the actor’s conduct outweighs 
the gravity of the harm.”114 Such an approach, which reflected the influence 
of the marginalist revolution in legal thought at the time,115 hardly eliminates 
the need for individualized analysis and often requires costly, case-specific fact 
finding. 
2. Choosing Between Default and Absolute Rules 
The second consideration is determining when a legal rule should be a 
default and when it should be absolute. “Cheapest cost avoider” rules come 
in both kinds. The rule that trains have the right-of-way over cars at grade 
crossings assigns the duty to the “cheapest cost avoider.” That rule does not 
 
 111. On inductive-loop technology, see 1 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
TRAFFIC DETECTOR HANDBOOK ch. 2 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
publications/research/operations/its/06108/06108.pdf. In addition, some emergency vehicles 
have the capacity to control traffic lights remotely. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., TRAFFIC SIGNAL PREEMPTION FOR EMERGENCY VEHICLES: A CROSS-CUTTING STUDY 2-1 
(2006), available at http://www.gtt.com/wp-content/uploads/Traffic-signal-preemption-for-
emergency-vehicles-A-cross-cutting-study.pdf.  
 112. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 123–59 (2015). 
 113. A doctrine of “nuisance per se” brands a few activities as nuisances without balancing 
utilities and harm. E.g., Koeber v. Apex-Albuq. Phoenix Express, 380 P.2d 14, 15–16 (N.M. 1963) 
(distinguishing “nuisances in fact” from “nuisances per se” (quoting Denney v. United States, 185 
F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). At common law, even fairly 
noxious activities were not a declared nuisance per se. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ossola, 199 A. 648, 651 
(Conn. 1938) (noting that storage of dynamite “does not constitute a nuisance per se”). 
 114. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 826 (1939); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 826 (1979) (restating the Restatement (First)’s rule that a nuisance exists only if “the gravity of 
the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. c (2010) (same). 
 115. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 123–59. 
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ordinarily contemplate that the parties can bargain around it. Indeed, you 
can get a citation for running a stop sign even if there is no traffic on the cross 
street.116 By contrast, a “cheapest cost avoider” default rule emerged in the 
late 19th century to govern risk of loss when real property is destroyed after a 
contract of sale had been executed but before the title was transferred. A 
strong economic case can be made that the risk of loss should travel with the 
party in possession, because that person is in the best position to avoid or 
minimize the loss. Indeed, a party not in legal possession may be powerless to 
minimize certain types of losses, such as risk of fire caused by activities inside 
the building. The nonpossessor has no right of entry.117 At the same time, 
however, there is no good reason why the parties should not be able to 
negotiate a different date for placing the risk of loss, assuming that there is 
no coercion and that defrauding of insurers, mortgagees, or other third 
parties is not involved. 
Absolute rules are necessary when the social costs of the wrong outcome 
are high and we cannot trust participants to reach the correct outcome on 
their own, or else when permitting them to bargain itself imposes significant 
social risk. For example, we could make the rule that cars yield to trains or 
that automobiles drive on the right side of the road a mere default rule, 
permitting participants to bargain for the alternative in specific cases. But the 
social gains from moving to a default rule are likely to be small, and there 
would be a certain number of miscommunications with perhaps fatal results. 
3. Minimum Coalition to Reverse a Default 
The third consideration is the minimum coalition needed to deviate 
from the default. The minimum coalition depends on the market type. The 
paradigm examples of private default rules involve pairwise relationships 
where no one else is affected, such as an agreement between a buyer and seller 
on the date title will pass, or the risk of loss rule in real estate sales. In a 
traditional competitive market transaction costs can be quite low, particularly 
if the good or service being traded is relatively fungible. The purpose of 
default rules in such markets is to facilitate mass transactions, such as through 
the use of form contracts. As products are more costly, more complex, or 
more differentiated the correct default may be more difficult to assign. 
However, to the extent only the buyer and seller are affected no greater 
coalition is needed to reverse the default, even though the market as a whole 
contains thousands of players. 
 
 116. E.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-1204 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013); N.Y. VEH. & 
TRAF. LAW § 1172 (McKinney 2012).  
 117. Samuel Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 
HARV. L. REV. 106, 122 (1895) (explaining that “it is wiser to have the party in possession of 
property care for it at his peril, rather than at the peril of another”); see also UNIF. VENDOR AND 
PURCHASER RISK ACT § 1 (1935). 
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In multi-party Coasean markets, by contrast, several people are affected 
by an outcome, and the minimum default coalition must typically be as large 
as the minimum bargaining coalition. For example, a covenant forbidding 
commercial uses in a ten-lot subdivision expresses a default rule. Because the 
covenant is contractual the owners can agree later to deviate from it. This does 
not mean, however, that one owner can give one neighbor the right to build 
a gasoline station; rather, agreeing around the default requires the 
unanimous consent of all ten owners. That is, ordinarily the same coalition 
that created the rule in the first place is needed to change it.118 
B. DEFAULT RULES IN TRADITIONAL MARKETS: COMMERCIAL VS. NONCOMMERCIAL 
Default rules are often used in traditional markets, where only two people 
are needed to make a trade and other parties are largely unaffected. An 
example is the widespread use of default rules in commercial contracts.119 
Default rules can be used to fill “gaps” in otherwise incomplete contracts, 
while permitting the parties to bargain around the rule in specific cases. The 
result is to reduce the cost of high-volume contracting.120 For example, in 
many markets deals are facilitated by form contracts that permit the parties to 
“redline” specific provisions in order to deviate from the form by 
agreement.121 
Contract default rules grew up mainly in the law of commercial contracts, 
and it is easy to see why.122 By relatively early in the 20th century, marginalist 
economists had developed the theory of business firm profit-maximization, 
which provided some objective criteria for predicting a firm’s best course of 
action. For example, the “hedonical calculus” developed by Jeremy Bentham 
was used by the late 19th-century marginalist F.Y. Edgeworth to predict 
bargaining behavior from assumptions about individual maximization.123 
That methodology ended up working better for business firms than for 
individuals, because business firms have profit functions that can often be 
specified, at least roughly, by an outside observer using objective tests.124 
Profit-maximization is a useful criterion for identifying default rules 
because it need not rely on state of mind or incommensurable utility 
preferences. It is also a way of escaping the complicating features of 
behaviorism in market economics. The “cheapest cost avoider” in Calabresi’s 
 
 118. See supra note 80. 
 119. On default rules in the Uniform Commercial Code, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1992). 
 120. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 97, at 108–11. 
 121. See, e.g., Kimaco, LLC v. Wright Dev. W. Coast, LLC, No. 66435-1-I, 2012 WL 556034, 
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012) (citing attorney edits and redlines of a form contract for 
commercial construction as evidence that the parties actually consented to the contract’s terms). 
 122. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 123–59. 
 123. See generally F.Y. Edgeworth, The Hedonical Calculus, 4 MIND 394 (1879). 
 124. See generally Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham’s Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161 (1918). 
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theory of accidents works in this fashion.125 We do not really care what the 
train engineer and the automobile driver are thinking, how much they would 
actually be willing to pay, what their bargaining strategies are, or their 
different and perhaps idiosyncratic attitudes toward risk. We merely need to 
know the engineering cost of stopping and restarting each vehicle. Even 
though the traffic at a grade crossing may include both commercial and 
noncommercial vehicles, in this case we are not particularly worried about 
idiosyncratic utility preferences. We assume that both sides want to avoid the 
accident and that the cost of stopping and restarting is the most important 
factor in assigning the obligation to stop. These results are admittedly 
external to state of mind and, to that extent, normative: they force behavior 
without regard to individually asserted preferences. 
Workable default rules for purely personal contracts are more difficult to 
develop because individuals maximize utility rather than profit, and utility is 
difficult or impossible to observe objectively. In addition, biological 
individuals, as opposed to firms, evaluate risk and process information 
differently. As a result it is more difficult to “fill in the gaps” in a putative 
agreement to, say, have sex or to marry. We rightfully insist on relatively 
complete manifestations of both consent and the content of the agreement. 
As outcomes are based more on idiosyncratic behavioral characteristics rather 
than objectively determined assessments of value, default rules are less useful 
as gap fillers. 
C. DEFAULT RULES FOR COASEAN MARKETS 
The more costly the bargaining process, the more important it is to assign 
a default rule correctly. If they are to be used at all, the selection of the correct 
default rule is more critical in Coasean markets than in traditional markets 
because Coasean markets generally function less well. The two-person 
Coasean market is a bilateral monopoly, in which bargaining is often thought 
to be difficult. Nevertheless, the common law properly permits the parties to 
change the default by mutual agreement, provided third parties are not 
injured. Indeed, this is what the basic Coasean story is all about. If the 
common law default rule is that Bridgman’s mortar and pestle is not a 
nuisance, then Sturges might nevertheless pay Bridgman to shut it down. 
The optimal default rule in such cases will assign the right to the person 
who places the highest value on it. That will make bargaining unnecessary to 
create the right outcome in situations where high transaction costs threaten 
to prevent the bargain from occurring. As noted earlier, application of this 
principle may be difficult in certain situations, such as the law of nuisance, 
because identifying the person who places the higher value on the right often 
requires case specific analysis. 
 
 125. See supra Part III.C. 
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Coasean markets also require unanimous consent to move a resource. As 
Coasean markets expand beyond two persons the costs of bargaining around 
the default can rise appreciably, and setting the correct default thus becomes 
increasingly important.126 Unfortunately, default rules also work less well in 
Coasean markets that have large numbers of players. Two-party agreements 
around the default will not work. For example, a jurisdiction might create a 
default rule that a factory smokestack in a residential area is a nuisance. In 
that case the smokestack cannot negotiate with a single landowner for a waiver 
from the rule because all the other injured landowners would still have the 
right to object.127 
VI. “STACKING” LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TO MINIMIZE FRACTURE: “ONE WAY” 
DEFAULTS 
Zoning laws typically are not default rules. They create rights and 
obligations that cannot readily be bargained away. For example, the zoning 
law might prohibit operation of the smokestack in a residential 
neighborhood. If that rule were simply a default, then the smokestack could 
bribe all affected landowners for the right to operate. 
But zoning laws do typically create asymmetrical, or “one way” defaults. 
They forbid bargaining over the activities they prohibit, but not over the 
activities they permit. This permits the zoning regime and private bargaining 
to be “stacked” in socially useful ways. Assume, for example, that Bridgman’s 
mortar and pestle is not unlawful under the zoning laws. Sturges could still 
pay Bridgman to shut it down. That is, the zoning statute might prohibit the 
confectioning business in a certain area, but it is not likely to require the land 
owner to engage in that business. 
Macro- and micro-rules for legal institutions can sometimes be stacked so 
as to permit making initial, or “baseline,” resource allocations efficiently, 
while letting private decision making apply ad hoc corrections in one 
direction. For example, under-deterrent zoning rules may be a good idea, as 
long as more restrictive alternatives can be bargained in. The zoning law 
would prohibit those uses that are highly likely to be inefficient in a given area 
and for which a large number of people have something at stake, but permit 
others that are subject to case specific bargaining, particularly where only a 
small number of people are affected. The bargaining regime occurs on top of 
the regulatory regime. 
The system that we have for land use has largely evolved into one such as 
this, using zoning rules to establish baseline use standards but then permitting 
privately negotiated servitudes to impose stricter standards. For example, 
 
 126. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 127. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 
685, 691–92 (2009) (complaining that various rules designed to limit corporate takeovers are 
not default rules, assuming that shareholders could effectively agree to negotiate around them). 
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zoning rules might keep smokestacks out of residential communities, on the 
theory that separating them from the beginning is the most efficient solution. 
No amount of private bargaining (other than obtaining a legislative zoning 
amendment) can overturn that result. This result is typically good because 
negotiating around such a rule would require unanimous consent of all 
affected parties, so the cost of making the right decision initially is far lower 
than the cost of mistakes and subsequent extraction. The premise, of course, 
is that segregating smokestacks from houses is rarely a mistake that needs to 
be corrected later. One could say the same thing about railroads in close 
proximity to residences.128 
But the zoning regime ordinarily does permit more intrusive private 
restrictive covenants that can be individualized over smaller groups of 
decision makers. These covenants manage at a more micro-level, extending 
to things such as more specific uses, types of building materials, pet 
ownership, landscaping, or outbuildings.129 The grosser zoning regulations 
ensure that people almost always get their assets located in the right place 
from the beginning, thus minimizing the costs of subsequent movement. But 
the “finer” servitude regulation permits more nuanced judgments, typically 
involving smaller groups of landowners, and typically in situations where the 
grosser judgments are much more difficult to make or likely to be mistaken. 
In addition to servitudes, the variance or special exception system in 
zoning ordinances creates a limited default rule with a relatively high burden. 
Zoning might separate industrial from residential uses but then give 
individual owners relief from proven mistakes that render the government’s 
initial decision suboptimal. The Supreme Court’s first forced “variance” 
decision, Nectow v. Cambridge, is a good example. The City of Cambridge 
mistakenly zoned Nectow’s land residential, even though it was completely 
surrounded by an automobile assembly plant, a soap factory, and railroad 
tracks, making the property worthless for residential purposes. The Court 
 
 128. E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (invalidating on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds the application of a zoning ordinance that made petitioner’s 
property worthless).  
 129. See, e.g., Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 565 P.2d 207, 211 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1977) (upholding a covenant prohibiting fences); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 
878 P.2d 1275, 1292 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (upholding a covenant restricting pet ownership); 
Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. 1969) (en banc) (upholding a 
subdivision architectural committee’s decision to prohibit a certain style of home); Wilshire 
Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding 
covenant against pet ownership); Woodward v. Cutrer, 838 So. 2d 180, 185 (La. Ct. App. 2003) 
(upholding covenant prohibiting piers or boathouses); Heston v. Ousler, 398 A.2d 536, 539–40 
(N.H. 1979) (upholding a restriction against docks and outbuildings); Syrian Antiochian 
Orthodox Archdiocese of N.Y. & All N. Am. v. Palisades Assocs., 264 A.2d 257, 262 (N.J. 1970) 
(upholding an architectural committee’s decision to prevent a certain building from being 
erected). 
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declared this application of the statute unconstitutional, thus forcing 
municipalities to provide administrative relief from such errors.130 
Under modern law the resolution of the Sturges v. Bridgman nuisance 
dispute could come about by either zoning legislation or private agreement. 
Both parties were operating businesses, so a simple zoning rule segregating 
business and nonbusiness uses would not prevent them from moving into the 
same building. A more refined zoning ordinance that classified types of 
business might have done so, but such refinement would very likely increase 
the likelihood, and thus the social cost, of initial regulatory mistakes. So a 
zoning classification system might permit a confectionary and a physician’s 
office to operate in close proximity, perhaps under a classification such as 
“mixed use,” “commercial,” or “retail and professional.” These classifications 
generally permit non-polluting and relatively non-invasive businesses to be 
located on adjoining properties. Beyond that, however, developers or 
adjoining landowners could negotiate servitudes or similar private 
agreements that would provide additional limitations on a contractually 
negotiated basis.131 Failing that, of course, they could use the law of nuisance 
and the court system.132 A well-designed system of this sort would minimize 
the sum of the cost of initial mistakes and forced movement, as well as 
subsequent bargaining. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE DESIGN OF MARKETS 
We do not usually expect highway drivers to bargain over the right-of-way. 
By the time the bargaining relationship is set up, it is too late because 
extraction is too costly. People bargain in markets, but the market for optimal 
rules about rights-of-way does not consist of a single pair of drivers 
confronting each other at the danger point. Rather, it includes all those 
driving on a jurisdiction’s roads who are in a position to have a resource 
conflict with one another. The “cheapest cost avoider” solution is not a 
bargaining solution at all, but one driven by engineering or safety concerns, 
 
 130. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188–89; see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and 
Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 345 (2002) (“To 
withstand constitutional scrutiny a zoning regulation must yield a legitimate public benefit 
without unduly burdening any individual citizen.”). 
 131. E.g., Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Meridian Hills v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ind. 1961) 
(finding that the city could not constitutionally exclude a church from an area zoned primarily 
residential); Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2004) (holding 
that although the zoning ordinance permitted daycare facilities on residential property, 
petitioner was not precluded from enforcing a restrictive covenant that prohibited them).  
 132. E.g., Beam v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2179-S, 2006 WL 2588991, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2006) (holding that noisy air compressors on the roof of a grocery store lawfully 
built in a commercial zone was not a common law nuisance); A to Z Paper Co., Inc. v. Carlo Ditta, 
Inc., 775 So. 2d 42, 47–49 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a concrete batching facility lawfully 
built in a “mixed use” zoning classification was not a nuisance); Karpiak v. Russo, 676 A.2d 270, 
271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that a landscaping business lawfully operated in a commercial 
zone was not a nuisance under the Restatement (Second) nuisance rule adopted by the court). 
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or else it is simply a convention that must be consistent over a larger number 
of transactions. For example, driving on the right may not be inherently safer 
than driving on the left, but a uniform rule for either side is certainly safer 
than permitting drivers to negotiate with one another on a pairwise basis as 
they are approaching. 
Are markets involving more established pairwise relationships any 
different? Coase thought so because he accepted previously locked-in 
commitments as his starting point. Once neighbors have invested in their 
current locations, a bargaining analogy is helpful because it helps determine 
which is the least harmful among the alternatives available at that point. But 
a superior solution may be an ex ante rule that forbids them from locating in 
close proximity in the first place. Coase underestimated both the value of that 
consideration and the number of times that the State would have to be 
involved in making it. 
A well-designed system for allocating resources necessarily involves the 
heavy use of markets, but markets must be properly designed. Coase’s 
suggestion that the legal system would be unimportant but for transaction 
costs133 could literally apply only to a social contract formed during some 
initial position when people had made no resource commitments whatsoever. 
As soon as the first investment is made, however, all bets are off. From that 
point the movement of resources can be costly with or without transactions, 
and a well-designed legal system must minimize the costs of movement by 
both transactional and nontransactional means. To be sure, while bargaining 
over the price of moving a smokestack might be costless and perfect, someone 
still has to tear the smokestack down and rebuild it in a different place. 
 
 
 133. See Coase, supra note 1, at 16. 
